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As Justice Requires/Permits:
The Delimitation of Harmful
Speech in a Democratic Society
john a. powell*
[What should experience be but a future implicated in a pres-
ent!
-- John Dewey'
[Humanity's] capacity for justice makes democracy possible;




This Article will argue that liberty, free speech and equality
are not separate independent norms. Instead, they are related
and must be evaluated based on the requirements of justice. 3 Mor-
timer Adler asserts that the amount of liberty or equality permit-
ted be as much as justice requires. 4 Just as there is no one concept
of justice, I will also argue that our conception of the self is anemic
and needs to be enriched. Much of our thinking about law, liberty
and equality is based on an enlightenment view of a unitary stable
self that is not plausible. I will suggest that the self is multiple,
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1. JOHN DEWEY, The Need For a Recovery of Philosophy, in ON EXPERIENCE,
NATURE, AND FREEDOM 27 (Richard Bernstein ed., 1960).
2. REINHOLD NEIBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF
DARKNESS: A VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL
DEFENSE xi (1944).
3. This is similar to John Rawls' argument asserting that liberty and equality
are contextualized in the norm of "justice as fairness." See JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 13 (1973). While one might argue for different notions of jus-
tice, the notion precedes the question of the appropriate amounts of liberty and
equality afforded to individuals by society. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF
JUSTICE 31-32 (1983).
4. See Mortimer J. Adler, We Hold These Truths: Understanding the Ideas
and Ideals of the Constitution 97 (1987).
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fractured and interdependent, and that this has important impli-
cations for how we should think about speech and equality as part
of a democratic project. Our approach to the self in general and
racial categories in particular may be reconceptualized. This
reconception has important implications for law. I will also assert
that popular slogans such as "more speech" as a remedy for injuri-
ous speech are counter-factual and normatively wrong. My goal in
this Article is to sketch a normative and pragmatic view of free
speech and equality that is grounded in participatory democracy
as justice and a more realistic view of the self.
Like a richer view of the self, racial categories are not static,
natural or coherent. Race is a social construct, and powerful social
forces operate to render racial classifications opaque. Language
materializes racial constructions. Epithets and similar linguistic
constructions seriously harm minority members of society, indi-
vidually and collectively, because of what such constructions sug-
gest about the described individual's place within our social fabric.
Yet when society debates the issue of how to regulate hate speech,
the focus is primarily on the infringement of liberty interests. Un-
fortunately, we often overlook or misunderstand abuses of free
speech, such as the tendency of free-speech advocates to portray
their opinions in a way that precludes others' ideas. 5 Most Ameri-
cans, including scholars and judges, take it as self-evident that we
are free to "speak our minds."6 Yet as Professor Fish observes,
"restriction, in the form of an underlying articulation of the world
that necessarily (if silently) negates alternatively possible articula-
tions, is constitutive of expression. Without ... an inbuilt sense of
what it would be meaningless ... or wrong to say, there could be
no assertion and no reason for asserting it."7 Nonetheless, the as-
sertion that free speech in fact is not "free," and should not be free,
involves for many a degree of cognitive dissonance.8
5. See STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH (AND ITS A
GOOD THING, Too) 102 (1994) [hereinafter FISH, SPEECH]. "'Free speech' is just the
name we give to verbal behavior that serves the substantive agendas we wish to
advance; and we give our preferred verbal behaviors that name when we can ...
because in the rhetoric of American life, the label 'free speech' is the one you want
your favorites to wear." Id.
6. See john a. powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and
Equality, 85 KY. L.J. 9, 11 (1996) [hereinafter powell, Worlds Apart ] (offering an-
ecdotal evidence of this perception).
7. FISH, SPEECH, supra note 5, at 103.
8. In one sense, there is nothing terribly provocative about the notion that
free speech isn't "free." This fact has always been recognized to some extent, as
evidenced by the famous dissents of Holmes and Brandeis in Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow, Holmes eloquently states that "[e]very idea is an
incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other
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This discomfort occurs precisely because our tradition pur-
ports to embrace unconstrained expression. 9 First Amendment
discourse traditionally forms part of the larger, more general nar-
rative of liberty. Within this liberty narrative exists a rich but in-
coherent array of values that scholars often invoke to support an
expansive notion of free speech.10 Free expression occupies a
privileged position in our democratic society because many feel
that any suppression would stifle the liberty and autonomy inter-
ests of the speaker, listeners and society in general.
In recent years, courts and scholars have begun to question to
what extent and under what conditions speech actually promotes
individual autonomy," checks censorship 12 or ensures the attain-
ment of truth and knowledge 13 in an uninhibited marketplace of
belief outweighs it ...." Id. at 673. Holmes goes so far as to suggest that if the
price of free speech to a free society is the overthrow of that society, that price
must be paid. See id.
9. See FISH, SPEECH, supra note 5, at 115 ('Absent some already-in-place and
(for the time being) unquestioned ideological vision, the act of speaking would
make no sense, because it would not be resonating against any background under-
standing of the possible courses of physical or verbal actions and their possible
consequences.").
10. See ADLER, supra note 4, at 140-44; LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT
SOCIETY 57 (1986) [hereinafter BOLLINGER, TOLERANT SOCIETY]; Lee C. Bollinger,
The Tolerant Society: A Response to Critics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 979, 979-80 (1990)
[hereinafter Bollinger, Response]. The genealogy of liberty's privileged position
can be found most apparently in Lockean and Enlightenment notions of individu-
alism, although Calvinist Protestantism, incipient consumer capitalism, and even
the claims of republicanism contributed to what became by the mid-nineteenth
century a rights mentality. See Kenneth L. Karst, Paths to Belonging: The Consti-
tution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 365-67 (1986). Tyrannies are
perceived to share the essential attribute of evil, but the value emphasized in re-
sponse to this evil is a function of zeitgeist, rather than an absolute antidote.
Thus, although liberty was the value emphasized by the founders as the antidote
to the evil of tyranny, see ADLER, supra note 4, at 140-44, there is a consanguine, if
not wholly overlapping, genealogy with respect to the role of liberty in vitiating
specific tyrannies. See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality and Community: Lessons from
the Civil Rights Era, 56 NOTRE DAME LAW. 183, 183-99 (1980).
11. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971) (quoting Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)) ("Freedom of discussion.., must embrace all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of their period.").
12. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977
AM. B. FOuND. RES. J. 521 (discussing the First Amendment as a check on gov-
ernmental abuse of power through restriction of critical expression).
13. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1941)
(Hand, J.) (The First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of
authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have
staked upon it our all."); Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 878-79 (1963). The attempt to develop a compre-
hensive theory of the First Amendment encompasses many years and many com-
mentators. Professor Emerson, a noted proponent of free speech, nonetheless ad-
1998]
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ideas. 14 To promote these values, orthodox proponents of free
speech argue that suppression of expression cannot be justified
unless the speech falls within a recognized category of harmful
speech. 15 Therefore, orthodox free speech advocates refuse to ex-
mits that the effort has not been adequate. See id. at 878-87. His own effort, in
turn, continues to be criticized as inadequate. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 47-50 (1989) (discussing Emerson's second and
fourth values, the advancement of knowledge and the achievement of an adaptable
and stable community); BOLLINGER, TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 43-103
(discussing the classical model of free speech); OWEN FISS, LIBERALISM DIVIDED:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MANY USES OF STATE POWER (1996) (characterizing
the free speech controversy as not only a conflict between liberty and equality, but
also a conflict between liberty of individual expression and liberty of access to
public debate).
14. See, e.g., BOLLINGER, TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that
society views free speech based on the "marketplace of ideas" principle); RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS pt. I (1997) (providing a
chapter each on hate speech and pornography and legal responses to the issue of
harm); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE
AND LAW (1987); THE PRICE WE PAY (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds.,
1995). Each of these works posits that, to a greater or lesser extent, much of the
expression protected under the First Amendment cannot be brought under the
shelter of conventional justifications, such as truth seeking. Each also suggests
that the cost of responding to expression which is harmful often remains an unex-
amined aspect of justification; that is, the cost to liberty is presumed to be too
high, but this is never discussed. See Bollinger, Response, supra note 10, at 981-
82.
Commentators and courts increasingly recognize that speech can be, and often
is, not just offensive but harmful. Hateful forms of expression, such as racist as-
persion and pornographic imagery, can inflict concrete injuries that do not fall
readily into traditional speech justifying frameworks. For a discussion of psycho-
logical harm in the context of hate-speech and pornography see GORDON ALLPORT,
THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (1954) (also noting that racism harms the perpetrator
by inhibiting mental development); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra, at pt. I; James
V. P. Check, The Effects of Violent Pornography, Nonviolent Dehumanizing Por-
nography, and Erotica: Some Legal Implications from a Canadian Perspective, in
PORNOGRAPHY: WOMEN, VIOLENCE & CIVIL LIBERTIES 351-54 (Catherine Itzin ed.,
1992) (noting the legal issues of obscenity); Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the
First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 591 (arguing that "pornography is 'low-
value' speech, entitled to less protection from government control than most forms
of speech ... [and] can be regulated consistently with the first amendment").
Although the harm stemming from speech acts often suggests notions such as
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and other tort-style injuries, inhibition
of the opportunity to participate fully in one's community is perhaps the greater
harm. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound. A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets and Name Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. REV. 133, 143 (1982). It is com-
monly noted that harm is difficult to quantify. However, this is true throughout
tort law, as for example, in wrongful-death cases. The mere fact that speech can
inhibit participation suggests that it is a democratic harm and thus partially un-
dermines utilitarian arguments. See generally Bollinger, Response, supra note 10,
at 981 (discussing the sources of law's frequent inadequacy in dealing with future
harm); powell, Worlds Apart, supra note 6, at 56-66 (discussing responses to utili-
tarian justifications for free speech)
15. See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 143-
48 (1989) (providing a list of free speech exceptions).
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amine harms from speech falling outside of the recognized catego-
ries.
This approach is exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.16 This case examined the constitu-
tionality of a city ordinance which allowed the prosecution of an
individual who burned a cross on the front yard of an African-
American family.17 The Court determined that the city ordinance
proscribing speech that insulted, injured or provoked violence on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender was unconstitu-
tional because its prohibition discriminated against disfavored
subjects.'8 Rather than view the case as one that posed the equal-
ity interest in participatory access to one's community against an-
other individual's interest in free expression, the Court treated the
case as one involving solely issues of free speech and censorship. 19
The Court's one-sided treatment of conflicting values highlights
the failure of the dominant narrative to encompass any argument
asserting that expression not only serves to cultivate personal
autonomy, but can also undermine it. At the same time, R.A.V.
vividly illustrated that very little falls within the doctrinal cate-
gory of "harmful speech that can be regulated."20 Justice Scalia,
while repeating a litany of categories that had been said to exist
outside "the area of constitutionally protected speech," 21 nonethe-
less observed that no category of speech "is entirely invisible to the
Constitution."22 In other words, RA.V. epitomizes the dominant
narrative insofar as it privileges the act of expression over any
other consideration, even when other constitutional norms are at
issue.
While the exalted status of the First Amendment among lib-
eral values is understandable, 23 history teaches that no one value
16. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
17. For an extended treatment of the facts of the case, see Charles R. Law-
rence III, Crossburning and the Sound of Silence: Antisubordination Theory and
the First Amendment, 37 VILL. L. REV. 787 (1992).
18. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 378.
19. See id. (lacking any discussion of equality or participation).
20. Id. at 382-83 (discussing categories of harmful speech).
21. Id. at 383 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)
(referring to obscenity)).
22. Id.
23. See ADLER, supra note 4, at 140 (observing that our deeply ingrained ap-
preciation of liberty values in the American tradition stems from overthrow of tyr-
anny, and that the founding fathers were "first and last, proponents of liberty,
with either no thought about an equality of conditions for all or, worse, with obsti-
nate prejudices against it."); BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 25-43 (1967) (contending that the founders were primarily
concerned with the threat of corrupt and arbitrary uses of power, and by exten-
1998]
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supporting democratic society remains static, either in importance
or in application. 24 The reverence the First Amendment has tradi-
tionally been accorded as a means of vitiating multiple tyrannies
should not mean that classic doctrinal formulations are sacro-
sanct.25 This Article suggests that a democratically valid judicial
decision must clearly enunciate a conception of justice informed by
an awareness of the multiple values within our society and the
multiple identities within ourselves. 26 Reformulation of identity in
sion, with accountability and legitimacy in the exercise of political authority);
Blasi, supra note 12, at 528-38 (explaining the importance of free expression be-
cause it checks the abuse of power); cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1146 (1991) (suggesting that the First Amend-
ment was not intended to be "first" in a foundational sense, but rather worked in
concert with two other proposed amendments to provide a structural barrier
against pursuit of self-interested agendas).
24. The history of equal protection law provides an obvious example of a
change in the degree of valuation over time. At the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), the Court was unable or unwilling to see that the stigma of alien-
ating treatment undermined the value of equality. By the time of Brown v. Board
of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court was able to recognize that the psychic
harm of segregation undermined Black students' sense of equality. As Professor
Schauer notes, arguments for limiting free speech during the middle part of this
century were primarily based on concern for conflict of the right to expression with
accepted values such as national security and public order. See Frederick Schauer,
Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1285 (1983). Changes in First
Amendment doctrine can largely be attributed to changes in the relative values
accorded to these competing interests over time.
25. The purpose of this Article is not to weigh in favor of either free speech or
equality at the expense of the other, but to suggest that the inclination to privilege
absolutely one set of values, principles, and metaphors over the other is too often a
function of misunderstanding and myopia infused with power. This problem can
be described as one of "rational prejudgment," a concept which suggests that legal
judgment is largely if not wholly indeterminate. See RICHARD POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 124-25 (1990) (observing that conflict of interest re-
cusals and divisive appointment politics support the common-sense notion that
judges analyze fact patterns from their own, usually unconscious, narrative
framework). It is only when narratives are largely coterminous that legal deci-
sion-making takes on the trappings of neutrality and inevitability, and the ap-
pearance of an autonomous discipline capable of applying valid rules to reach de-
terminate results. See id. at 430-33 (discussing the legacy and demise of the Legal
Process school).
26. What is already clear is that recourse to justice cannot be grounded on an
objective and transcendental claim. This Article follows Professor Torres in ap-
plying to legal analysis the insight that there is not justice, rather there are jus-
tices. See Gerald Torres, Critical Race Theory: The Decline of the Universalist
Ideal and the Hope of Plural Justice-Some Observations and Questions of an
Emerging Phenomenon, 75 MINN. L. REV. 993, 994 (1991). The divergent concep-
tions of justice can be viewed as strategies to achieve particular results, to either
transform or perpetuate racist society. Professor Fish notes that the absence of
neutrality compels the conclusion that First Amendment doctrine is purely a mat-
ter of politics, and that is why George Bush could support a constitutional amend-
ment prohibiting desecration of the flag while at the same time opposing hate
speech regulation. See FISH, SPEECH, supra note 5, at 110. However, justice rep-
resents more than just strategy. We also resort to the concept on the basis of a
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light of the insights proffered by critical race and post-modern
theorists suggests that the classic remedy for harmful speech-
that is, more speech-will, in some instances, perpetuate dispari-
ties of power and destabilize our sense of self. The marketplace of
ideas cannot self-regulate so long as objections to lack of participa-
tory access are subsumed by claims that the liberty interest in ex-
pression is primary to the equality interest in participatory access.
A self-regulating marketplace presupposes an equal starting line-
an assumption that has never been a reality in American political
life.27
Although much has been written on the topic of the harmful
aspects of speech, too little attention has been given to the ways
that racial identity informs and constrains society's ability to en-
gage in productive dialogue. This impediment in turn undermines
the efficacy of more speech as an antidote to expression that harms
the participation interests of marginalized members of society as
well as distort the participation of the majority. This Article at-
tempts to identify some of the psychological and social construc-
tions that hamper efforts to mediate between the reality and the
formalism of First Amendment jurisprudence. Part I briefly de-
scribes the traditional narrative of the First Amendment, focusing
on the argument that more speech serves as a panacea for any in-
jury stemming from harmful expression. In addition, Part I ex-
amines the psychological concepts of participatory empathy and
multiplicity and suggests that these concepts undermine a basic
assumption of the "more speech" remedy-that all members of so-
ciety have the ability to participate meaningfully in democratic in-
stitutions. Part II develops links between philosophical pragma-
tism and theories of justification and participatory access,
emphasizing the implications of pragmatic insight into the pro-
found constructedness of our institutions. Part III cautions that
the values that are at stake when we talk about regulating hate
belief that consulting a collective sense of justice substantiates and legitimizes a
particular result. See generally john a. powell, The Multiple Self- Exploring Be-
tween and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1997)
[hereinafter powell, Multiple Sell] ("[T]here was a concurrent need to construct an
ideology to justify certain practices, such as slavery and colonialism, which clearly
violated norms emanating from an equal and essential self... [y]et the very man-
ner in which modernists defined the self justified those practices.").
27. As Cass Sunstein points out, the First Amendment currently languishes in
a sort of pre-New Deal torpor, in which existing distributions of power are consid-
ered inviolable. See Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255,
264 (1992) (noting the applicability to the First Amendment of President Roose-
velt's reference to "this man-made world of ours' and his insistence that 'we must




speech may be preserved through an adoption of a democratically
pragmatic conception of participatory justice. This Article con-
cludes by examining Keegstra v. Regina,28 a Canadian Supreme
Court case that serves as an example of how lucid reasoning con-
cerning the fundamental interest in participatory access is capable
of balancing the values of both liberty and equality.
This Article also concludes that in recognizing participation
as a value superior to any significant experience of or aspiration to
liberty or equality, authentic democratic foundations presuppose
that all actors share a common narrative grounding. Recourse to
the regulative ideals of democracy will not, of course, prove to be a
panacea. Rather, by recognizing the plasticity and multiplicity
embedded in a mature democratic vision, we can identify and work
toward resolving unnecessarily pronounced tensions. Contextual-
ized discussions of opposing narratives demonstrate that in many
ways the referents are the same-the demand for equal liberty is
also a demand for democratic equality.
I. Many Voices-One First Amendment
A. More Speech: The Traditional First Amendment
Narrative
Free speech exists generally to promote personal and political
autonomy, but scholars offer differing formulations of which spe-
cific values are significant.29 Professor Emerson, for instance, has
identified four principle values: "(1) individual self-fulfillment and
self-realization, (2) truth finding, (3) participation in decision-
making, and (4) balance between stability and change." 30  This
framework has led to increasingly nuanced formulations, 31 but has
proved incapable of providing a workable explanation about whether
28. [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1.
29. See, e.g., ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTI-
TUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1960) (asserting that freedom of speech guaran-
tees religious beliefs and ownership of property); Emerson, supra note 13, at 878-
79 (examining the function of free speech in a democratic society); Kent Greenaw-
alt, Free Speech Justifications, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 119 (1989) (setting out justifica-
tions for free speech).
30. For a more complete discussion of the various criticisms and reformula-
tions of Emerson's values, see powell, Worlds Apart, supra note 6, at 44-48. This
Article focuses on how the value of participation may be inhibited or promoted by
speech. When Professor Emerson discusses participation, he refers exclusively to
the formal notion that as long as there are no overt constraints on participation,
the autonomy, or liberty, interest in being permitted to participate in the laws one
must adhere to is met. See id. at nn.150-51.
31. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 47.
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each value is equally important, and how to resolve inevitable ten-
sions resulting from situations in which these values conflict.3 2
In this traditional narrative, any limitation on the freedom of
the speaker threatens her autonomy and self-development. While
it is apparent that privileging the value of unrestrained expression
will conflict with the value of participation, particularly in the
sense that this choice will compromise the ability of disempowered
groups to constitute themselves socially, society views the right to
say whatever one chooses as primary. 33 The traditional claim is
that free expression is privileged not only because it is necessary
to the pursuit of truth and self-development, but also because free
expression does not cause "real or substantial harm."34  Even
among those commentators who recognize that hateful speech can
cause substantial harm, the value of expression in promoting
autonomy and individual development invariably trumps the de-
sire to limit speech. 35 Of course, it is impossible to ignore the
paradox that a right designed to foster autonomy can have the ef-
fect of undermining others' autonomy. 36 Nonetheless, theorists at-
tempt to finesse this point by adopting the position that only a
narrow category of "coercive" speech warrants restriction. 37
The classic formulation of the "marketplace of ideas" appears
in Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrains v. United States.38 The mar-
32. Some commentators believe that the essence of free speech is the liberty
right of the speaker. See id. at 47-51. Others suppose that the essence of free
speech is its social and political force. See BOLLINGER, TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra
note 10, at 46. It is clear that limitations on speech affect the autonomy of the
speaker and that certain speech acts can compromise the rights of the listener.
Few commentators believe that this tension can ultimately be resolved. See Rob-
ert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 267, 289 (1991); see generally BOLLINGER, TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note
10 (discussing the insufficiency of rationales proffered in support of the First
Amendment).
33. See Post, supra note 32, at 273.
34. powell, Worlds Apart, supra note 6, at 58. Of course, the law of libel pro-
vides an obvious example of exceptions to the assertion that speech does not cause
real harm. See id. at 58-59. Nonetheless, commentators often trivialize the harm
that racist speech causes by claiming that it is only an insult or a harm to civility.
See id. at 60.
35. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 50 (arguing that the foundational status of
autonomy and individual liberty militates against utilitarian balancing of First
Amendment rights).
36. See Frank A. Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democracy in
America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339, 353 (1992)
(noting that racist speech impairs communicative autonomy as well as participa-
tory access to democratic institutions).
37. See BAKER, supra note 13, at 56. For a more extended discussion of this
argument, see powell, Worlds Apart, supra note 6, at 62-64.
38. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tlhe best test of truth
19981
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ketplace of ideas is premised on the belief that the non-
intervention of the state is the best guarantor of identifying truth
and falsehood.3 9 This premise has been challenged on several
grounds. John Stuart Mill believed that there was a causal link
between freedom of speech and attainment of knowledge. 40 The
view that truth is self-evident, needing only expression to be rec-
ognized, however, assumes the existence of an objective truth that
is identifiable. 41 It also assumes that the public will eventually
identify what is true within a "marketplace of ideas."42 If either of
these assumptions is flawed in some way, as Professor Schauer ob-
serves, the proper response is an empirical inquiry into whether
an open market does in fact maximize the attainment of truth.43
One might ask why the same insights that law applies to economic
markets-that disparities of power based on race, class, and gen-
der discrimination are reproduced in an open market-should not
also be applied to speech. 44
In addition one may ask whether the basic assumptions of
the marketplace of ideas might not also be faulty on psychological
grounds, and if so, what might be the appropriate response within
a pluralistic democratic framework. The ongoing debate regarding
the permissibility of proscribing hateful speech to vindicate equal-
ity interests invites us to explore these issues.
The discourse about the relationship between free speech and
equality arose in reaction to both psychological research confirm-
ing the dangers of pornography and a rash of incidents, including
cross-burnings, racist graffiti in dormitories and residential areas,
and physical attacks. 48 The corresponding promulgation of hate-
speech regulation continues to occasion incisive law review articles
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the mar-
ket").
39. See generally KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES (5th
ed. rev. 1966) (chronicling a history of attacks upon free discourse).
40. See JOHN STUART MILL, Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, in ON
LIBERTY 15, 33-52 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1978) (1859).
41. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY 19-29 (1982) (discussing the relation of knowledge to open expression).
42. See id. at 16. "Freedom of speech can be likened to the process of cross-
examination. As we use cross-examination to test the truth of direct evidence in a
court of law, so should we allow (and encourage) freedom to criticize in order to
test and evaluate accepted facts and received opinion." Id.
43. See id.
44. See generally FISS, supra note 13, at 12-17 (noting that media centraliza-
tion skews the politics of scarcity); Sunstein, supra note 27, at 261 (arguing for a
"New Deal" for speech).
45. See MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY,
ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1-15 (1993).
[Vol 16:97
DELIMITATION OF HARMFUL SPEECH
and books,46 but has produced little genuine dialogue. Instead,
much of what passes for discourse may be better described as par-
allel debates or serial monologues. 47
The debate is more complex than the predilection for abso-
lutist solutions would suggest. This problem of complexity, how-
ever, is mostly one of perspective. That is, our narratives delimit
our capacity for empathetic dialogue. 48 Unfortunately, we are
usually unaware of the extent to which we operate within a par-
ticular conceptual framework or even that there are other, com-
peting frameworks. This oversight impedes our ability to antici-
pate the response that a particular action will likely create in a
person with a different perspective.
Journalists offer an excellent example of the way our narra-
tives construct and constrict our interests and responses. I often
receive calls from reporters after racist incidents on college cam-
puses. They are almost always interested in whether explicitly
racist incitements might lead to the consideration of policies to
limit speech by the college. Very few are interested in the rise of
explicit racism and the consequent threat to equal opportunity for
minority groups on college campuses. To the extent that they rec-
ognize these issues, they see them as trumped by free speech con-
cerns. 49 There is both a failure to seriously engage other perspec-
tives and to see free speech as more than a unitary concept. There
is an assumed harm associated with anything less than an abso-
lutist view of speech and a trivialization of the serious harm that
speech can and does cause. After speech is situated in a primary
46. See, e.g., FISS, supra note 13; HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION:
VOLUME 2: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE: RECONCILING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
AND EQUALITY OF CITIZENSHIP (Steven J. Heyman ed., 1996) (collecting law review
articles and other commentary on the topic).
47. See powell, Worlds Apart, supra note 6, at 27 (noting that even the most
thoughtful works attempting to reconcile the values of liberty and equality end up
privileging one or the other).
48. By "narratives" I do not mean to suggest that each of us has a story to tell,
but that each of us is in fact our stories. As Oliver Sacks states,
We have, each of us, a life-story, an inner narrative-whose continuity,
whose sense, is our lives. It might be said that each of us constructs and
lives a 'narrative', and that this narrative is us, our identities. If we wish
to know about a [person], we ask 'what is [that person's] story .....
OLIVER SACKS, THE MAN WHO MISTOOK HIS WIFE FOR A HAT AND OTHER CLINICAL
TALES 105 (1985). A significant implication of this view is that no language is
merely descriptive. This has enormous ramifications for the study of law. See
generally Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073
(1989) (noting that "[t]he experience of justice is intimately connected with one's
perception of 'fact,' just as it is connected with one's beliefs and values").




position, concern about racist hate speech and White domination
through speech is seen as no more than a move to censor, or at
least chill, speech. This happens without serious consideration of
the chilling and more destructive effects of speech that maintain
exclusion and racial dominance. Professor Fish similarly observes
that when journalists reflexively complain that hate speech regu-
lations may have a potentially "chilling effect," they focus on the
right of expression to the detriment of other rights.50 That is, they
fail to consider how the chilling effect of hate speech impacts upon
targeted minorities constitution of self or participation.
Of course, the world only makes sense because we have an
orientation to it, and it is inimical to our social psychology not to
identify with that perspective. 51 In ignoring or suppressing the
subjectivity of our perspective, we fail to examine the multiple and
various functions of speech that are at times in conflict with the
values underlying freedom of speech. Problems occur when the
lens through which we see the world destroys our ability to recog-
nize that what is peripheral for us may be central or defining for
others. Through this failure to notice and examine that which is
outside the dominant perspective, the harm caused by the free
speech regime is either undetected, or when detected, seen as neg-
ligible.
The self-absorbed focus exacerbates the perpetual nature of
narrative structure. Divergent premises lead to ever more diver-
gent solutions. Professor MacIntyre suggests that this problem of
incommensurability makes many contemporary issues seem in-
tractable:
We thus inhabit a culture in which an inability to arrive at
agreed rationally justifiable conclusions on the nature of jus-
tice and practical rationality coexists with appeals by con-
tending social groups to sets of rival and conflicting convic-
tions unsupported by rational justification . . . . Disputed
questions concerning justice and practical rationality are thus
treated in the public realm, not as matter for rational enquiry,
but rather for the assertion and counter-assertion of alterna-
tive and incompatible sets of premises.52
50. In recounting the story of a journalist writing for a university newspaper
who complained that in the wake of hate speech regulation there would always be
something in the back of his mind, Professor Fish comments that we respond by
reminding him that there's always been something in the back of his mind, and his
complaint merely begs the question of whether "it might be better to have this
code ... than whatever was in there before." FISH, SPEECH, supra note 5, at 111-
12.
51. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 3-8 (David E.
Ling ed. & trans. Univ. of Cal. Press 1976).
52. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 5-6 (1988).
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The implications of this assessment are not as dire as they first
appear. Professor MacIntyre does not mean that incommensura-
ble narratives cannot be compared, but only that there is no neu-
tral or natural vantage point from which to do this. 53 Rather, the
challenge is to develop self-conscious heuristic devices which are
capable of teasing out commonalities or, when necessary, fusing
separate horizons. 54 Professor MacIntyre's observations under-
mine the objectivist argument for the marketplace of ideas. If
there is no Archimedian point from which to compare assertions,
then the various interpretive communities that constitute a demo-
cratic society ought to agree upon a framework in which to engage
in dialogue. It seems obvious that the mere assertion of one narra-
tive perspective, with no attendant concern for understanding
competing world views, does little to promote social or political
dialogue. Yet our free speech jurisprudence analyzes each indi-
vidual act of expression independently, with little regard for how
that expression fits into the complex web of social discourse. In a
democratic system, which presupposes engaged citizens capable of
discovering truth through debate and interaction, the marketplace
of ideas might always serve the purpose of fostering political de-
bate by providing a forum in which all participants have meaning-
ful access. Denial of access in one situation or sphere may be less
troubling if access were available in others. But many in our soci-
ety are consistently denied meaningful access in a number of criti-
cal sites. This distorts the democratic process and our identities.
Most free speech advocates do not even acknowledge this systemic
problem, let alone offer remedies for it.
B. Participatory Empathy as a Function of Democratic
Values
When speech exacts an injury, the call for more speech rings
hollow and is often clearly wrong. It also obscures the fact that
much harmful speech is designed to hurt and to undermine the
autonomy of the victim. A threatening phone call, a cross burned
on the lawn of a Black family or a swastika placed on the home of
a Jewish family cannot be explained adequately in terms of the
autonomy and expression rights of the speakers. Nor do remedies
for property damage capture the harm to the recipient. Where
53. See generally RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY
(1989) (attempting to show that self-creation and human solidarity are equally
valid, but incommensurable).




speech takes place in a larger community and causes offense, it
might be more plausible to ameliorate the injurious effects with
more speech, but only if certain conditions prevail.
For example, in R.A.V., the cross-burner presumably in-
tended to impress upon the Jones family that the Jones were not
welcome in the community. That other community members do
not share that sentiment does little to detract from the powerful
alienating force of the statement. While the members of the Jones
family may in fact have formal access to their community, perhaps
through a letter in their community newspaper, they may presume
correctly that such a response does little to engage the cross-
burners in a dialogue. The cross burners have already conveyed
the fact that they do not care to hear what the Jones family has to
say.
The unfortunate reality is that the "more speech" remedy is
ineffectual where one party to an exchange lacks the capacity for
empathetic and respectful dialogue and the other lacks the power
to mandate engagement. Where parties to an exchange share lit-
tle in the way of overlapping narratives, assertions and counter-
assertions are likely to remain parallel, passing each other without
ever engaging the intended listener. This does not mean that
members of a democratic society should not strive to gain an un-
derstanding of perspectives outside their own experience. None-
theless, the current reality, ignored by the traditional First
Amendment narrative, is that the marketplace of ideas is not only
skewed, but by its nature incapable of neutrality. The market-
place of ideas excludes and thus reproduces disparities in power.
Disparities in power lead to disparities in participatory access. It
is clear that in many hate speech cases the purpose and the effect
is to injure and exclude, not to find the truth or engage in mere
self expression.
The marketplace of ideas metaphor became popular when so-
ciety still believed in an objective truth. As this belief has been
undermined, the apparent power of the metaphor is called into
question. Some commentators have recognized this and have sug-
gested a foundation based on a weaker claim of objective truth.
Bollinger has argued for more speech based on a tolerance ration-
ale instead of a truth rationale, and Baker has used liberty as his
foundation.55 I have suggested that the function and values re-
lated to speech are varied and multiple, which suggests that the
55. See BOLLINGER, TOLERANT SOCIETY, supra note 10, at 140-44; BAKER, su-
pra note 13, at 67-69.
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foundation and justification for speech must also be varied and
multiple. But because of the unstable and multiple nature of
speech values and truth, I assert that participation in the demo-
cratic self-constitutive process is prior to liberty and tolerance in
many sites.
While the value of respect has received significant atten-
tion,56 too little commentary exists discussing the uneasy relation
between empathy and law. 57 As used in this Article, empathy re-
fers to an experientially defined emotional response to the situa-
tion of another, the capacity to dance lightly in another's reality.
Empathy requires consideration and effort and thus presupposes
an experiential component 58 insofar as it is evocative of a desire to
transform 59 the necessarily limited bounds of one's experiential re-
ality.60 Genuine empathy is an active process, rather than a pas-
sive statement of principle. 61
56. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA (1989) (discussing
the ideals, perceptions and realities of equality in America).
57. For a detailed discussion of empathy in the legal context, see Lynne N.
Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987), which attempts
to reconcile empathy, understanding people's experiences through interpretation
or intersubjectivity, with legality, or rule-based law.
58. It is important to note that much, and likely the majority, of human expe-
rience is internal and consists of reflection and judgment. Too often we think of
experience as simply a collection of sensations and external encounters.
59. In employing the term "transform" in the textual sentence, rather than
"transcend," I mean to emphasize that when change and insight occur, we are al-
ways already in another context. Drucilla Cornell similarly suggests that the
boundary between "transcend" and "transform" can be located by reference to reci-
procity. See Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Tragedy and Complacency, 81 Nw. U. L.
REV. 693, 697 (1987) [hereinafter Cornell, Beyond Tragedy]. See also Drucilla
Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 291, 295 n.15 (1985) [hereinafter Cornell, Ethics] (observing that Unger's
philosophy, see supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text, fails to account for the
necessity of validating one's world-view through dialogue with others).
60. The extent to which one can hope to realize this desire is the subject of
much debate. See, e.g., Cornell, Beyond Tragedy, supra note 59, at 697 (arguing
against Roberto Unger's idea that "the individual's striving must culminate in the
recognition of her own fundamental interconnectedness with others"-that is, in
reciprocity); Lawrence Lessig, Plastics: Unger and Ackerman on Transformation,
98 YALE L.J. 1173 (1989) (exploring the meaning of the term "transformation" in
critical race theories). Professor Kohlberg has utilized the concept of "reversibility," or
'reciprocity of perspectives," as a tool to be employed in confronting competing
perspectives. See MICHAEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATWVE ACTION AND JUSTICE 249
(1991). This concept requires that conflicts be resolved by "subjecting all the com-
peting claims" to each perspective involved, in order to ensure "the claims that can
be justified from all the relevant perspectives." Id. This theory requires the actors
to place themselves imaginatively in the place of the other actor. Compare id. at
249-50 (quoting Lawrence Kohlberg, Justice as Reversibility, in PHILOSOPHY,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 269 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds., 1979)) (suggesting
that the competing claims be reconciled through "moral musical chairs") with
sources cited supra note 59 (questioning our ability to achieve transformation by
1998]
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The conception of empathy as experiential conflicts with Pro-
fessor Delgado's critique of empathy. 62 Delgado discusses the
prevalent notion of empathy as a means by which marginalized
peoples can identify with each other, and dominant cultures can
identify with those who are marginalized. This concept, he sug-
gests, is counter-productive. 63 Singled out for special censure in
this critique are public interest lawyers. 64 According to the pro-
recourse to imaginative displacement, without more). Professor Rosenfeld notes
that the ambiguities implicit in the concept of reversibility suggest a distinction
between different perspectives and different worlds. See ROSENFELD, supra, at
250.
61. Reliance on empathy must avoid the danger of idealizing language, thereby
deepening the gulf between rhetoric and action. See powell, Worlds Apart, supra
note 6, at 11 n.3. Instead, a participatory system should understand empathy to
be a pragmatic, experiential avenue for weakening the centripetal forces of an in-
sular narrative structure. The regulative pull of genuine dialogue can thus serve
as a catalyst for breaking out of our little worlds.
62. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? 4-36 (1995) [hereinafter
DELGADO, RACE WAR]. This critique is presented in a more developed form in
DELGADO & STEPAHNIC, supra note 14, at 115; Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Elev-
enth Chronicle: Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REV. 61 (1996). The term
"empathetic fallacy," coined by Delgado and Stefancic, has its corollary in literary
criticism. In their view, both the "pathetic fallacy," a critique of anthropomor-
phism in poetic imagery, and the empathetic fallacy similarly stem from hubris,
the belief that through "speech and remonstrance we can surmount our limitations
of time, place and culture, can transcend our own situatedness." DELGADO &
STEFANCIC, supra note 14, at 72. This definition locates the shortcomings of empa-
thy in the linguistic and formative constraints on our ability to overcome our own
interested narratives. However, empathy does not, as I try to develop below, re-
quire an idealization of language in order to effectuate shifts in consciousness.
That is, while empathy does not insist on the possibility of transcending our selves,
neither does it reject the possibility of being transformed through engaging in dia-
logue. Rather it recognizes that we are both constrained and redefined by the val-
ues we embrace and the conversations in which we engage. See GADAMER, supra
note 51, at 59-69; ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 111-13
(1975).
63. See DELGADO, RACE WAR, supra note 62, at 10. Delgado's conviction that
reliance on empathy is counterproductive may stem from acceptance of the less
than sanguine vision of prospects for equality forwarded by Derrick Bell. See Der-
rick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1992) (arguing that a
"realistic" assessment of current racial conditions brings about a release from de-
spair). Cf. john a. powell, Racial Realism or Racial Despair?, 24 CONN. L. REV.
533, 545-49 (1992) [hereinafter powell, Racial Realism] (arguing that a pragmatic
and hopeful notion of equality is "self-evident" and transformative). Indicative of
Delgado's orientation is his instructive metaphor of a computerized judicial sys-
tem, used to suggest that people don't really want an empathetic society. See
DELGADO, RACE WAR, supra note 62, at 9. Even if a computer could simulate judi-
cial decision making, we wouldn't want it, because the machine would not permit
preferential treatment. See id. at 10. That is, investment bankers and suburban
teenagers wouldn't receive disproportionately lighter treatment by virtue of their
status. See id. Society would rebel, demanding preferential treatment for the eco-
nomically privileged. The metaphor is instructive, but has less to do with empathy
than it does with the propensity to maintain and perpetuate privilege. See id.
64. See id. at 25.
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tagonist in Delgado's book, "[t]o be both a lawyer and an empa-
thetic human is practically an impossibility."65  The protagonist
believes that people think they are more empathetic than they
really are. 66 The character states that "a sentimental, breast-
beating kind [of empathy] is common among White liberals."67
This argument regarding empathy reverses the Gramscian notion
of false consciousness, in which marginalized peoples adopt their
oppressors' values and perspectives, thereby becoming complicit in
their own oppression. 68 That is, White attorneys attempting to ar-
ticulate the experience of their minority clients co-opt their clients'
experiences and become complicit in their clients' oppression. This
contrast between false consciousness and articulation of a client's
story, while superficially attractive, seems to miss the mark. Del-
gado actually seems to be describing a semiconscious falseness
masquerading as empathy. While Professor Delgado identifies a
problem that should give us pause, it should not detract from the
possibility of real empathy.
The reasons given for this gap between intentions and reality
are twofold. First, the empathy claimed by clinicians is not genu-
ine empathy, but rather "sentimental breast-beating"69 resulting
from cognitive and narrative theory barriers and from most White
folks not possessing "double consciousness," defined as the ability
to view the world from two perspectives simultaneously. 70 Second,
there are institutional barriers: lawyers cannot tell their client's
65. Id. at 27.
66. See id. at 18.
67. Id. at 12.
68. Gramsci actually used the term "juridical problem" to describe the coerced
"adaptation" of the masses in accordance with the requirements of the goal to be
achieved. According to Gramsci, the law of the State performed this function by
creating an ostensibly neutral site of desirable homogeneity. See ANTONIO
GRAMScI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS, 195-97 (Quintin Hoare &
Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1971); see also GEORG LUKACS, HISTORY
AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS (Rodney Livingstone trans., 1971) (interpreting and
applying Karl Marx's methods as Marx understood them); Theodore W. Adorno,
Introduction, in THE POSITIVIST DISPUTE IN GERMAN SOCIOLOGY 21-22 (Glyn Adey
& David Frisby trans., 1969) (discussing false consciousness as it relates to true
consciousness and objective truth). Milan Kundera describes a phenomenon simi-
lar to "false consciousness" with the phrase "the brilliant ally of one's own grave-
diggers." MILAN KUNDERA, IMMORTALITY 118 (Peter Kussi trans., 1990). By this
he intends to decry a cavalier acquiescence to post-modern pastiche, implicitly rec-
ognizing that empathy and relativism are two very different things.
69. DELGADO, RACE WAR, supra note 62, at 12.
70. Id. at 13 (citing W.E.B. DUBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLKS 16-17 (1903);
RALPH ELLISON, THE INVISIBLE MAN 1-7 (1952)).
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story other than in the desiccated, stylized form required by the
system.71
The first, cognitive, barrier aspect of this claim is predicated
on "norm theory," a social-psychological hypothesis which holds
that empathy varies in proportion to our perception of the
"normalcy" of a situation. That is, the situation of starving Ethio-
pians appears "normal" to wealthy North Americans, but that of
an upper-middle-class family losing their home seems "abnormal."
Wealthy North-Americans' ability to identify with the distress of
each party correlates with this perceived normalcy.72 Thus, empa-
thy dissipates in proportion to the extent to which inequalities are
structurally ingrained and normalized.
The second strain of the false empathy claim rests on institu-
tional barriers. Here we stand on well-traveled ground.73 As I
suggested above, the journalist reflexively privileges the First
Amendment precisely because the legal narrative resonates with
her own. Similarly, the lawyer will be constrained by the narra-
tive of legal storytelling because she was trained to represent her
client's interests within the parameters of that institution. That
the institution disallows the telling of a contextualized, coherent
story is a cich6. The law can be viewed as a story and a fiction but
because of its central role in our institutional structure is reified so
that the fiction becomes opaque.
While Delgado's claims of the empathetic fallacy are insight-
ful and instructive, he seems to be describing bathos74 rather than
empathy. In current usage, bathos has two primary meanings.
The first is a strained or insincere pathos (understood as an emo-
tion of pity over suffering of oneself or another), which is what
Delgado's character seems to describe when he attributes to public
interest lawyers a solipsistic liberal empathy. In this scenario, the
attorney rails against the injustices done to her client not out of a
deeply felt sense of pathos, but rather because the attorney wants
71. Cf. Monroe H. Freedman, Atticus Finch: Right and Wrong, 45 ALA. L. REV.
473 (1994) (offering a reassessment of Atticus Finch, the much heralded lawyer
from Harper Lee's To Kill a Mockingbird, on several grounds, including that he
failed to tell Tom Robinson's story largely because of unquestioning adherence to
extant legal structures; nonetheless Finch is largely perceived as empathizing with
his client).
72. See id. at 17; see also EZRA STOTLAND ET. AL., EMPATHY AND BIRTH ORDER
124 (1971) (suggesting that we do in fact empathize more easily with people simi-
lar to ourselves).
73. See generally Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989).
74. The term 'bathos' is derived from the Greek word for depth. See Webster's
II New College Dictionary 94 (1995).
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the audience to empathize with her hopeless cause. 75 This de-
scribes false depth, a common fault among those seeking to pro-
mote or attain a conception of justice to the exclusion of material
reward.7 6 Having dispensed with monetary gain, a particularly
conspicuous and ubiquitous reward system, public interest attor-
neys may ascribe pure intentions to themselves for the purpose of
self-aggrandizement. 77 This phenomenon also resonates with the
definition of bathos as the unexpected appearance of the vulgar or
base in otherwise elevated language. Although bathos is primarily
a term of literary criticism, Delgado's empathetic fallacy describes
an analogous situation with the appearance of less than admirable
motives in an otherwise irreproachable moral stance. Delgado's
critique is thus one of bathos and does not preclude reliance on
empathy as a basis for fostering participation as a societal value.
Of course, to avoid the problem of false empathy raised by
Delgado is no easy task. The move toward real empathy may re-
quire more than just listening. It may also require a willingness to
identify constraints, including power and hierarchy. While Del-
gado warns of false empathy, he pushes us toward the problematic
space of the infinite other.
Wittgenstein suggests a less direct critique of empathy. He
suggests that in the act of empathizing, we may attribute to the
objects of our empathy emotional reactions that they do not really
experience. Asking whether "such a thing as 'expert judgment'
about the genuineness of expressions of feeling" actually exists,
Wittgenstein answers that "[c]orrecter prognoses will generally is-
sue from the judgments of those with better knowledge of man-
kind."78  The sort of knowledge that informs those "better judg-
ments" will be a product of experience. 79 Knowledge gleaned
75. See DELGADO, RACE WAR, supra note 62, at 28.
76. See id. at 27-28.
77. See, e.g., SOREN KIERKEGAARD, PURITY OF THE HEART IS TO WILL ONE
THING (Douglas V. Steere trans., 1935) [hereinafter KIERKEGAARD, PURITY] (one of
Kierkegaard's so called edifying addresses, arguing that pure intention requires
superhuman effort and making an unconditional demand of decisive activity);
THOMAS MERTON, No MAN IS AN ISLAND 52 (1955) (alluding to the prevalence of
this phenomena in the priesthood); Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98
YALE L.J. 1559 (1989) (decrying self-righteous behavior in the legal environment);
see also Freedman, supra note 71, at 479-82 (using To Kill a Mockingbird as a ve-
hicle for critiquing the unintentionally solipsistic and paternalistic character of
many White civil rights lawyers).
78. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 227e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1968).
79. Id. Experience can be guided, but what one learns is not a technique but
correct judgments. There are rules, Wittgenstein observes, but they do not form a
system, and only experienced people can correctly apply them. See id.
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through a wide range of experience and human interaction is thus
a necessary precondition to empathy because knowledge informs
judgments.
The "better knowledge" that Wittgenstein has in mind im-
plies a particular attitude toward experience, an attitude that em-
braces the porousness inherent in our interactions with the world.
Acceptance of our particular orientation as provisional encourages
us to exist outside of carefully constructed safe harbors where ex-
perimentation does not entail risk.8 0 This suggestion to let our
guard down, and to adopt vulnerability and openness as an orien-
tation toward experimentation, is voiced by Roberto Unger. Unger
asserts that because the "gesture of self-exposure lacks a prede-
termined outcome"8 1 -a situation in stark contrast to the range of
possibilities yielded by the shared claims of pre-existing communi-
ties-it emphasizes the power inherent in the individual to treat
character as open and revisable.8 2
80. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, PASSION: AN ESSAY ON PERSONALITY 95-
99 (1984) [hereinafter, UNGER, PASSION] (acknowledging the risk of failure atten-
dant in the exposure of our habits and modes of self-expression to reinvention).
This type of risk, understood as a positive openness to "endured vulnerability,"
should be distinguished from the type of "risk" involved in violent opposition to the
forces that threaten our physical selves. See also SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE
SECOND SEX 72 (H.M. Parshley trans. & ed., 1968) (1949) (suggesting that this type
of "risk" is more consonant with Western notions of genuine autonomy than the
more relational risks involved in embracing vulnerability).
81. UNGER, PASSION, supra note 80, at 98.
82. See id. Unger's vision of human psychology owes much to what he de-
scribes as "two different and even antagonistic traditions," that of the Christian-
romantic view of human nature and the revolutionary modernism of the early
twentieth century. Id. at 22-23. The former tradition also embraces vulnerability,
though not always in the secular guise presented by Unger. See SOREN KI-
ERKEGAARD, FEAR AND TREMBLING passim (Alastair Hannay trans., 1985) (locating
in the theistic "leap of faith" the only possible resolution to the anguished choice
between rival goods). Less pietistic, though no less existential, is the romantic as-
pect of human nature embedded in the embrace of vulnerability. This vision com-
plements the Christian tradition by prescribing "personal confrontations that es-
cape the limits of any instrumental calculus" as the necessary precursor to self-
knowledge and self-transformation. UNGER, PASSION, supra note 80, at 29. These
sources of existential ideals find their common denominator in Kierkegaard, who
viewed his superhuman confrontations with faith as capable of removing the ob-
stacles standing in the way of achieving temporal love. See WILLIAM BARRETT,
IRRATIONAL MAN 151-55 (1958). Thus the Christian-romantic view of human na-
ture reconciles the "primacy of personal encounter and of love as its redemptive
moment, and the commitment to a social iconoclasm expressive of man's ineradi-
cable homelessness in the world." UNGER, PASSION, supra note 80, at 24.
The modernist aspect of Unger's philosophy lies in that movement's recogni-
tion that "the personality makes and discovers itself through its experience of not
fitting into the given settings of its existence." Id. at 34. This axiomatic modernist
insight is beautifully explicated in Lionel Trilling's distinction between sincerity
and authenticity:
Sincerity, a congruence between avowal and feeling, can be achieved when
[Vol 16:97
DELIMITATION OF HARMFUL SPEECH
Professor Unger believes that an essential attribute of expe-
riential revision is "a subjection of the self to situations and en-
counters that shake the routines of ... outward life and the routi-
nized expressions of . . . passions."83 Our personal capacity to
explore the psyche has its methodological and pedagogical ana-
logue in a scholastic willingness to experiment with structures of
discourse. 84 Although our self-knowledge remains necessarily
ephemeral, it serves as justification for action and revision, only so
far as experience recommends. To some extent our willingness to
experiment will depend on the degree to which we believe that
problems such as racism and sexism cannot be eradicated without
a fundamental alteration of our norms, our psychology and even
our identity.
One commentator believes that the solutions proffered by lib-
eralism for our most disruptive social problems are mere tinkering
on the surface, and that racism is coterminous with the ideals of
the Enlightenment project.85 The truth in this position is a neces-
sary adjunct to the imposition of a convenient legal formalism with
respect to issues of race. But it is difficult to know how liberalism
and racism will be linked in the future even if they were cotermi-
nous at their inception. Professor Unger suggests a way out of this
negative dilemma in his admonition that precisely because our in-
stincts and analyses may deceive us, we never know if a particular
maneuver will be major or minor.86 This inherent ambiguity
should not cause despair,87 but rather insist on deeply experiential
methodology reliant for its normative prowess on the persuasive
there is no problem of form: it is based on the Romantic ideal of truth to
the self and it presupposes a definite identity which it becomes the task of
a lifetime to be true to. Authenticity is a more excruciating modern de-
mand, which begins with the admission that there is a problem of form,
and that this makes the congruence between avowal and feeling difficult:
it recognizes that the issue is not truth to the self but the finding of the
many selves that one might wish to be true to. It makes the liberating
concession that a person, or a nation, has a plurality of identities, con-
stantly remaking themselves as a result of perpetual renewals.
Declan Kiberd, Introduction, in JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES ix, ixxvii (Penguin 1992)
(quoting Lionel Trilling).
83. UNGER, PASSION, supra note 80, at 98.
84. The limits, and even the efficacy, of this experimentation have been the
subject of much debate in the legal academy. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytel-
ling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH L. REV. 2411
(1989); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay
on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
85. See, e.g., DAVID THEO GOLDBERG, RACIST CULTURE (1993) (analyzing race,
its social expressions and implications and the understanding of these in contem-
porary social analysis).
86. See UNGER, PASSION, supra note 80, at 98.
87. See powell, Racial Realism, supra note 63, at 550.
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capacities of perspectives arising from endured vulnerability and
radical openness.
This pragmatic epistemology suggests that a revisioning of
empathy as a core democratic value requires that the concept be
re-described in a way that embraces the openness that bathos or
false empathy so notably lack. We are not hopelessly constrained
by our perspectives-rather through engagement and vulnerabil-
ity we can be influenced in a way that incrementally transforms
our character. 88 Engagement does not entail becoming the other
but rather requires possible openness to meaningful, contextual-
ized encounters. This is not an idealist stance that ignores struc-
tural or institutional arrangements but asserts that structure once
visible can be rearranged to allow for empathy and democracy.
C. Multiplicity as Participatory Empathy
A common response to the assertion that knowledge is provi-
sional and thus undeserving of an uncritical dominance is to in-
voke the negative aspects of post-modernism.8 9 In one form, the
post-modern world view perceives fundamental cultural fragmen-
tation and collapse, a pathological splintering in all spheres of life.
More particularly, certain post-modern theorists have character-
ized modern culture as ironically degraded or bemusedly crisic, or
as kitsch laden.90 Presented in this manner, post-modernism
88. Cf. Jody Armour, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 733 (1995). Professor Armour, drawing
on recent research in cognitive psychology, distinguishes between stereotypes and
personal beliefs. She argues that there is no necessary congruence between these
mental attributes, but rather that stereotypes are a form of habit that may be
overcome through conscious awareness. See id. at 734. It should be noted, how-
ever, that if stereotypes exist at a largely unconscious level, an enormous amount
of vigilance and self-awareness will be necessary for their extirpation. See id. at
746-47 (citing Charles Lawrence, The Ego, the Id, and Equal Protection: Reckoning
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322-23 (1987)).
89. As a general matter, post-modernism may be understood as an attitude
rather than a full-blown philosophy, and within the confines of theoretical dis-
course has been employed to signify divergent phenomena such as late-capitalist
cultural logic, see FREDRIC JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF
LATE CAPITALISM 1-6 (1991), and a "struggle over the technology of the human
body." See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN
INTRODUCTION (1978). Post-modernism also signifies a complete collapse of the
relation between theory and its object. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE
POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE (1984).
90. See JAMESON, supra note 89, at 55-57. In attempting to tie post-modern
sensibilities to a Marxist teleology, Jameson refuses to either celebrate or disavow
the entire jumbled concept. Though avowedly tendentious, his text provides a si-
multaneously comprehensive and accessible introduction to the post-modern and
its antecedents in various current spheres. Other useful texts include DAVID
HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF
CULTURAL CHANGE (1989) (providing a denser, more rigorously economic approach
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seems only to tear down or denigrate the achievements of liberal
modernity without offering an alternative.
One alternative to the negative definitions so prevalent in
post-modern discourse can be found in the psychological and theo-
logical concept of multiplicity. Multiplicity, most notably repre-
sented in the work of the neo-Jungian psychologist James Hill-
man, holds that the "crisis" of cultural fragmentation results from
our psychological insistence on unity and singularity. 91 Borrowing
from Greek mythology and Jungian traditions, Hillman counsels
against a psychology of exclusion. In his view, psychological
"polytheism" implies an essential and profound division of the
soul.92 Rather than viewing this fragmentation as a pathology,
however, Hillman suggests that society would benefit from an al-
ternative definition of the psyche. Hillman prescribes a restruc-
turing of our view of the psyche as naturally multiple-in other
words, altering our definitions instead of expanding our notion of
disorder. It is no accident of history, he suggests, that the term
"schizophrenia" and the number of cases of pathological multiple
personalities appear at around the same time as the First World
War, a time when the definition of the ego as a unifying force stood
in stark contrast to the existential dissociations of early cultural
modernism. 93 Hillman also refers to William James, who recog-
nized psychological and cultural fragmentation nearly a century
ago, noting that "[r]eality MAY exist in distributive form, in the
shape not of an all but of a set of eaches, just as it seems to be." 94
to the subject) and UNIVERSAL ABANDON? THE POLITICS OF POSTMODERNISM
(Andrew Ross ed., 1988) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL ABANDON] (providing representa-
tive takes on the subject from an array of disciplines).
91. See JAMES HILLMAN, A BLUE FIRE: SELECTED WRITINGS 36-49 (Thomas
Moore ed., 1989) [hereinafter HILLMAN, BLUE FIRE]; JAMES HILLMAN, RE-
VISIONING PSYCHOLOGY 26-27 (1975) [hereinafter HILLMAN, RE-VISIONING]. As I
have argued elsewhere, the assertion that the modern, Western, unitary, and
autonomous conception of the self is wrong and does not entail a necessary aban-
donment of structure. See powell, Multiple Self, supra note 26, at 1485.
92. See HILLMAN, RE-VISIONING, supra note 91, at 26 ("Polytheistic psychology
refers to the inherent dissociability of the psyche and the location of consciousness
in multiple figures and centers."); cf. JOSEPH CAMPBELL, MYTHS TO LIVE BY 10-11
(1972) (noting that the identity constitutive aspect of shared symbols and myths
creates ethical and social order).
93. See HILLMAN, RE-VISIONING, supra note 91, at 25; see also JAMESON, supra
note 90, at 305-13 (discussing political and cultural undercurrents of early mod-
ernism).
94. HILLMAN, BLUE FIRE, supra note 91, at 43. James further notes that ab-




The multiplicity of the self has long been applied to problems
of identity outside of the American, Western tradition.9 5 The con-
cept of "selflessness" in Buddhist philosophy denies "a self de-
scribed in terms of its structure rather than its story."96  This
structural self, initially perceived as "permanent, unitary, and un-
der its own power," diminishes in importance once the Buddhist
practitioner begins to understand emptiness. 97 This process re-
quires a thorough familiarity with the "ordinary experience of
self,"98 which, once achieved, permits the insight of "emptiness"-
the recognition of persons and things as "dependent arisings," ex-
isting interdependently rather than independently. 99 In this phi-
losophy, the self that people tend to see as concrete exists only as
an illusion, but an illusion with ethical consequences. Though
consideration of such views moves us seemingly far afield from
prevailing legal discourse, the tenets of Buddhist philosophies and
neo-Jungian psychology suggest that perhaps the conceptions of
self-identity embedded in legal structures leave us predisposed to
attach ourselves to the illusory narrative of the unitary self. Both
show us how the constructed and unessential phenomena of lan-
guage and concepts create the patterns that we perceive as static,
natural and neutral.100
One of the central insights of psychological multiplicity is the
notion that many liberal paradigms rest on faulty psychological
premises. As illustrated below, multiplicity explains some of the
ways in which the psychological phenomenon of "projection"''1 1
serves to mask power disparities that undermine the traditional
First Amendment narrative's remedy of "more speech." The cen-
tral point to be derived from the following discussion is that psy-
95. See generally powell, Multiple Self, supra note 26, at 1484 n.9 (citing recent
scholarship on post-modern and post-liberal conceptions of the self).
96. ANNE CAROLYN KLEIN, MEETING THE BLISS QUEEN: BUDDHISTS, FEMINISTS,
AND THE ART OF THE SELF 124 (1995); see also powell, Multiple Self, supra note 26,
at 1505-09 (discussing Buddhist conceptions of the self and noting that Buddhism
does not attempt to construct a unitary, coherent sense of self).
97. KLEIN, supra note 96, at 124.
98. Id. at 125.
99. Id. at 127.
100. Of course, both Buddhist philosophy and Jungian psychology suppose that
there is an "essential" consciousness that goes beyond concepts and language. See
JEREMY W. HAYWARD, SHIFTING WORLDS, CHANGING MINDS: WHERE THE SCIENCES
AND BUDDHISM MEET 132 (1987); THE PORTABLE JUNG 23 (Joseph Campbell ed. &
R.F.C. Hull trans., Viking Press 1971) [hereinafter PORTABLE JUNG] (providing a
succinct overview of Jung's understanding of the psyche and the self).
101. Projection refers to a psychological mechanism whereby we project onto
others aspects of our own unconscious qualities and mistake these imaginings for
reality. See JUNE SINGER, BOUNDARIES OF THE SOUL 361-62 (1994).
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chological phenomena camouflage acts in which the dominant cul-
ture vilifies and silences minorities, thereby blocking meaningful
access to democratic institutions. The argument that the market-
place of ideas perpetuates disparities in power does not, as Cass
Sunstein notes, suggest that free speech is a myth. 102 Rather, it
means that "what seems to be government regulation of speech
might, in some circumstances, promote free speech .... [and] that
what seems to be free speech in markets might, on reflection,
amount to an abridgment of free speech."'1 3 The discourse within
the marketplace of ideas may, in some instances, permit a position
that is not only unpopular, but hateful, to limit the participation
interest of other individuals. After exploring the more abstract in-
sights of multiplicity, I will examine its utility in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
In one of several law review articles that explore the implica-
tions of psychological multiplicity for the law, Gerald Torres writes
that the term multiplicity "implies a decentralized ideology and
economy and, ultimately, a non-hierarchical culture."'1 4 Similarly,
Robert Chang notes that "each social agent is inscribed in a multi-
plicity of social relations," including sex, race, nationality, and vi-
cinity. 10 5 Each agent represents multiple subject positions, posi-
tions which are themselves "the locus of multiple possible
constructions, according to the different discourses that can con-
struct [those] position[s]."'10 6 Angela Harris argues that a juris-
prudence based on "multiple consciousness" can overcome what
she views as the dangers of essentialism in feminist legal theory;
namely, that "the attempt to extract an essential female self and
voice from the diversity of women's experience" merely reinforces
socially constructed norms and minimizes the educative value of
experiences that fall outside that framework. 107 While none of the
102. See Cass R. Sunstein, A New Deal for Speech, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 137, 139 (1994).
103. Id.
104. Torres, supra note 26, at 1005.
105. Robert S. Chang, Essays: The End of Innocence or Politics After the Fall of
the Essential Subject, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 687, 690-91 (1996).
106. Id. (citing Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a
New Concept of Democracy, in MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 89-
90 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988)). Professor Chang presumes
that essentialism is always a proxy for coalition, or identity, politics and thus al-
ways a pseudonym for continued marginalization.
107. Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Femninist Legal Theory, 42
STAN. L. REV. 581, 613-15 (1990) [hereinafter Harris, Race and Essentialism]; see
also Angela P. Harris, Foreward: The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 207 (1996); CYNTHIA OZICK, Innovation and Redemption:
What Literature Means, in ART AND ARDOR 238 (1983); Mari Matsuda, When the
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above definitions precisely coincides with psychological multiplic-
ity, particularly with reference to the antecedent and essential as-
pects presupposed by the latter, the view of multiplicity as a stra-
tegic method is common to both legal and psychological
scholarship. As the positions taken by the above commentators
indicate, the notion of multiplicity has profound implications for
the static identity categories that have long been presumed in le-
gal thinking, and have too often resulted in cursory dismissal of
claims falling outside recognized narrative structures.
We might also take this view of multiplicity as strategy a step
further by asking what a multiple conception of the self conveys
analytically about race relations and resistance to proscriptions of
hate speech. Jung understood the Self to contain many autono-
mous but intimately related components that tend toward whole-
ness or unity. 0 8  One of these components, which he calls the
"shadow," represents "unknown or little known attributes and
qualities of the ego" that people prefer to deny the existence of in
themselves. 109 Through denial of their existence, these little
known ego attributes are frequently projected onto political others,
although the same attributes reside in ourselves, because we pre-
fer to convince ourselves that the "other" is wrong." 0 Without
thinking, we accept that if the "other" would only behave in a cer-
tain manner, everything would be better. These attributes are
characterized as subconscious because they are integral compo-
nents of our personality that emanate from our personal past but
have been repressed, thus obtaining an inferior and primitive
quality."' This absence of consciousness gives rise to a moral re-
sentment, because the psyche tends toward equilibrium and psy-
chic deficiencies demand to be addressed. 112 Our capacity for mo-
First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989).
108. See generally THE PORTABLE JUNG, supra note 100, at 23 (providing a suc-
cinct overview of Jung's understanding of the psyche and the self).
109. See M.-L. vonFranz, The Process of Individuation, in MAN AND HIS
SYMBOLS 158 (Carl Gustav Jung et al. eds., 1964).
110. See Carl Gustav Jung, Approaching the Unconscious, in MAN AND HIS
SYMBOLS, supra note 109, at 85; see also Lawrence, supra note 88, at 322 (noting
that the human mind defends itself against the discomforts of guilt by excluding
unattractive beliefs and ideas from consciousness); powell, Multiple Self, supra
note 26, at 1502-05 (1997) (discussing how the unconscious projects "racial" traits
onto the "other").
111. See THE PORTABLE JUNG, supra note 100, at 80-81 (postulating that incom-
patible psychological elements are subject to repression, becoming an unconscious
part of our conscious personality, rather than an aspect of the unconscious, itself a
separate sphere of the psyche).
112. See id. at 81. Experience is not only how we relate to the world, creating
categories to deal with perceptions, but also a set of internal structures and expe-
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rality compels us, despite the pain of unmasking these less than
salutary aspects of personality, to assimilate this unconscious part
of the conscious self. 13 Though such analysis is unpleasant, it
tells us something important not only about each of our characters
as they presently are, but about what they want to be.
A Jungian interpretation of the Biblical story of Job offers an
instructive example of how awareness of the shadow aspect of the
personality can lead to a profound psychological transformation.114
The opening of the story finds Job as a seemingly well-adjusted,
successful and happy individual blissfully unaware of a plot be-
tween God and Satan to test Job's renowned faith in his God.115 In
order to test this faith, God permits Satan to subject Job to a vari-
ety of calamities, until Job has lost virtually everything to which
he has accorded any value.116
Job's initial response is one of despair and alienation, yet in-
fluenced by his friends, he remains convinced of his innocence and
righteousness. 117 According to this interpretation, Job's outlook
reflects his "one-sided conscious attitude of purity and good-
ness."" 8 At this point in the story, Job is only vaguely aware that
his experience has something to do with his past and with a larger
reality that he refuses to comprehend.1 1 9 As Edinger notes, Job
does not say what the iniquities of his youth were, but Job makes
it clear that he no longer considers himself responsible for them:
"[t]hose past sins [represent] repressed contents which he does not
riences that we project into the world, and onto objects or persons. This isn't to
negate outer reality, which is very real, but only to recognize that our reality has
an equally real "inner" component. According to Jungian psychology, reality is
"objective" insofar as we all experience similar archetypes in ways that allow us to
empathize with each other's inner experience and perceptions of the world. This
presupposes, however, a fairly high level of awareness and serious engagement in
dialogue with the meaning of internally produced images. See HILLMAN, BLUE
FIRE, supra note 91, at 26 (providing axiomatic criteria for interpreting images,
and suggesting that all images, if subjected to these criteria, obtain the status of
archetype).
113. See SINGER, supra note 101, at 165 (quoting Jung for the proposition that
uncovering the shadow side of personality is an essential act of self-knowledge and
meets with considerable resistance from the ego).
114. See EDWARD F. EDINGER, EGO AND ARCHETYPE 76-96 (1972); see also An-
swer to Job, in THE PORTABLE JUNG, supra note 100, at 519-650 (providing a dif-
ferent, but also psychologically useful, reinterpretation of the Job story).
115. See Job 1:1-5 (Revised Standard Edition).
116. See id. at chs. 1-2.
117. See id. at chs. 3-4. Job's friend Eliphaz attempts to console him, stating:
"Is not your fear of God your confidence, and the integrity of your ways your hope?
Think now, who that was innocent ever perished? Or where were the upright cut
off?' Job 4:6-7.
118. EDINGER, supra note 114, at 85.
119. See Job, supra note 115, at ch. 6.
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want to make conscious since they would contradict his self-
righteous image of himself."'12
0
Job's friends try to give him advice. 121 His friends contend
that he should continue down his former path, sure of his right-
eousness-in other words, they counsel Job to maintain the status
quo in ignorance that all has collapsed around him. 122 Job's ulti-
mate response is to avoid both extremes; instead, he refuses to ac-
cept his fate without ascertaining the meaning of these events.
123
By confronting God, Job is made aware of the meaning underlying
his ordeal: a transformation of his own psychic orientation to the
world.124 Through his confrontation with the powerful numinosity
of God, Job is forced to recognize that his former attitude was one
of blind arrogance. 125 During the encounter, God reveals Himself
to Job as an awesome totality, combining all dimensions of good
and evil. 126 From this, Job gains an awareness of his own shadow
side, which he had been repressing for so long.127 That is, "God re-
veals his own shadow side and since man participates in God as
the ground of his being, he must likewise share his darkness."'
128
Whereas Job previously projected what he perceived as weak and
unenviable attributes onto others, he now recognizes that they are
an inevitable dimension of his own personality.129
This experience of the shadow operates at the level of racial
politics as in all interpersonal relationships. Angela Harris paral-
lels Hillman in observing that for groups denominated as racially
"other" the "experience of multiplicity is also a sense of self-
contradiction, of containing the oppressor within one self."130 In
much the same way, the White oppressor also contains the other
within him or herself. The contrast between Hillman and Harris
occurs only to the extent that Hillman locates the shadow of ra-
120. EDINGER, supra note 114, at 86. For examples of Job's self-righteous atti-
tude, see Job, supra note 115, at chs. 29-30 (nostalgizing his privileged place in the
community and concluding: "But now they make sport of me, men who are
younger than I, whose fathers I would have disdained to set with the dogs of my
flock.").
121. See Job, supra note 115, at chs. 32-37.
122. See id. at ch. 34.
123. See EDINGER, supra note 114, at 85.
124. See id. at 91. The language in this chapter is a powerful explication of the
difference between God and humans. See Job, supra note 115, at 38:1-33.
125. See EDINGER, supra note 114, at 91.
126. See id. at 89-91
127. See id. at 91.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 107, at 608.
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cism as being "essentially present in 'white' consciousness itself
and not, as usually claimed, only projected outward into 'black."' 13'
A concrete example of the external and internal function of the
"other" as a disembodied yet integral part of the self occurs in the
process of exclusions by race and socioeconomic status. As Zora
Neale Hurston's character Janie, from Their Eyes Were Watching
God, painfully recalls, being placed in a social context of
'"hiteness" changed her experience of self:
So when we looked at de picture and everybody got pointed
out there wasn't nobody left except a real dark little girl with
long hair standing by Eleanor. Dat's where Ah wuz s'posed to
be, but Ah couldn't recognize dat dark chile as me. So Ah ast,
'where is me? Ah don't see me.' 132
In order to understand the ontology of the fractured self, it is im-
portant to question the construction of categories. Law as a rule
does not have the dubious luxury, promoted in Hillman's image of
psychology, of allowing psychological polytheism to erupt without
attempting to achieve insight. 133 The law's view of the self has
nudged forward, but it is still largely based in an eighteenth cen-
tury notion of the self that cannot withstand critical review from
psychological, anthropological, or popular perspectives. Yet the
multiple self is shadowed in the work of Freud and Jung and is in
full bloom in Hillman's. Law loves stable categories, even if they
are in conflict with reality, and to reconcile this need with an es-
sentially multiple conception of the self requires that we under-
take an examination of how categories are articulated and become
culturally intelligible and legally manageable. The burgeoning lit-
erature on the social construction of race and the renaissance of
interest in the work of authors such as James Baldwin and Zora
Neale Hurston assist in this endeavor. 3 4
131. HILLMAN, BLuE FIRE, supra note 91, at 8.
132. ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD 21 (1937).
133. See HILLMAN, BLUE FIRE, supra note 91, at 9 ("There is no need, in a poly-
theistic psychology, to integrate, to 'get it all together,' or to find some ultimate
blending of the many impulses and directions that erupt from the soul. A variety
of gods and goddesses are to be honored, the tensions among them sustained and
enjoyed.").
134. See generally GOLDBERG, supra note 85 (demonstrating that social subjects
have been conceptualized foremost in racial terms since the institution of moder-
nity and that these racisms change over time to reflect prevailing social concep-
tions); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
(1996) (exploring the social and legal origins of White racial identity); MICHAEL
OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE
1960S TO THE 1990S (1995) (exploring the creation and change of racial concepts
and how they become the focus of political conflict); Richard Thompson Ford, The
Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843
(1994) (asserting that equivocation, which stems from a dichotomous conception of
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Both the Buddhist concept of the self, or no permanent self,
and Hillman's concept of the multiple self are in sharp contrast to
the nineteenth century notion of an independent, unitary,
autonomous self. Instead both of these selves share substantial
similarities with concepts of the self suggested by many late mod-
ernists and feminists. The latter groups tend to view the self as
interdependent, interconnected, and constantly being reconsti-
tuted through social interaction.
If any of these views of the self are taken seriously as con-
trasts to the pre-given, unconstituted, liberal self, then systematic
exclusion through hate speech not only threatens participation,
but threatens both the construction and maintenance of the whole
notion of an autonomous self.135 Furthermore, the diminished
selves that result from exclusion cannot be healed through more
speech. The self that requires the exclusion of other potential
selves through hate speech and other practices is not simply an in-
dependent self, but a self that requires the subordination of others,
a direct conflict with our democratic norms.
What this suggests is that restrictions on speech should be
challenged to the extent that they undermine the self, as well as to
the extent that they undermine our participation in democratic
processes. This is no less true of other values, however, such as
equality. 136 Racist speech, however, is often practiced for the pur-
pose of distorting participation and is part of a racial discourse
that not only maintains racial hierarchy and exclusion, but also
helps to create and maintain the racial subject. In fact, the very
categories of Whiteness and racial Other are part of racial exclu-
sion and racial discourse. 137 The political legacy that flows from
racist speech is constitutive of both the racial self and White su-
premacy. If one is then seriously concerned about self expression,
participation and autonomy, then one must be willing to examine
how and where speech disrupts these values. There must be a self,
political space as either administrative conveniences or autonomous entities, un-
derlies the American law of local governments); Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as
Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709 (1993) (arguing that American law protects en-
trenched White power); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness and Trans-
formation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659 (1995) (exploring the connections between resi-
dential segregation and White privilege).
135. See powell, Multiple Self, supra note 26, at 1509-11. It should be noted
that this way of viewing autonomy does not rest on the notion that the self is pre-
given to social constitution and structures. Rather these alternative conceptions
suggest an autonomous self that is at least in part defined by, and acting within, a
larger social context and discourse.
136. See generally powell, Worlds Apart, supra note 6.
137. See generally sources supra note 134, with special attention given to
GOLDBERG, OMI &WINANT and HANEY-LOPEZ.
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for self-expression to have meaning. One can easily imagine cir-
cumstances where speech or equality diminishes the self and par-
ticipation, just as in some circumstances speech or equality will
support these values. When speech undermines the self, however,
it is difficult to articulate how it can be justified by democratic
norms.
It seems clear that the existing categories of free speech ju-
risprudence do not comport with the reality of the socially con-
structed racial self as illuminated by an empathetic understanding
of our multiple identities. Arguments concerning the persistence
of racism in insidious and subtle forms are rendered mutely inar-
ticulate by the correct categories. Our propensity to project unde-
sirable characteristics onto a political other serves to perpetuate
and reify deeply embedded structural disparities in the market-
place of ideas. As Professor Sunstein points out, while constitu-
tional jurisprudence has long since abandoned the Lochner-era
view of the Constitution as a prohibition of governmental interfer-
ence with the distribution of rights, this laissez-faire attitude per-
sists in the area of free expression. 138 Within the First Amend-
ment framework, pre-New Deal notions of neutrality still
predominate. 3 9 On one hand, the First Amendment's defiance of
New Deal insights into the nature of unregulated marketplaces
serves the important value of checking myopic governmental re-
strictions on individual liberties. 140 On the other hand, however,
the persistence of laissez-faire attitudes toward the marketplace of
ideas is a function of our inability to recognize the prevalence of
unconscious racist attitudes and practices. Because these atti-
tudes persist beneath the surface of American life, the occasional
eruption of hateful forms of expression is treated as anomalous.
This position, while psychologically soothing, fails to recognize the
severe harm to the minority cultures' participatory interests that
occurs when an overtly threatening act of racial hatred supple-
ments the structural de facto racism by the majority culture of our
society.
As Professor Delgado notes, the experience of racism in con-
temporary America is analogous to the way a seeing eye dog iden-
tifies a clumsy footfall on the part of its master-much prejudicial
behavior is unconscious and only registers to someone attuned to it
through an aggregation of experience. Moreover, subtle and un-
138. See Sunstein, supra note 102, at 138.
139. See id. at 139.
140. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a
statute proscribing flag burning).
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conscious forms of racist behavior, because of their ephemeral na-
ture, are often purposefully overlooked. No one wants to accuse
another of being racist if it is at once clear that the person's be-
havior is unconscious. This leads to another aspect of the frustra-
tion voiced through narrative: the inability of legal doctrine to
identify structurally important but diffuse and subtle racism.
In a recent work, Professor Delgado, a prominent Critical
Race Theorist, provides a fascinating compendium of "images of
the outsider in American law and culture."'141 His historical survey
shows that racial depiction throughout American history has been
predominantly negative and that the dominant stereotype changes
to reflect society's needs. 142 The historical depiction of Asians in
film, literature, cartoons, and popular humor provides an instruc-
tive example: scapegoats during depressions, cunning and savage
when war threatened, and treacherous or not-quite human when
the exigencies of military action demanded. 143 While these images
strike contemporary observers as clearly wrong, current stereo-
types are passed off as unexceptionable, trivial or a valid generali-
zation based on the common attributes of a particular group. 144
The reason for this, according to Delgado, is that racist views are
always embedded in the dominant interpretive structure. 45
While this structure both valuates and makes the racial
other, it also normalizes White supremacy, which can be seen in a
discourse of neutrality and colorblindness.
1. Objections to Multiplicity as Empathy: Relativism
I have offered an alternative to the liberal concept of the self
that has implications for how we view equality and free speech. As
an initial matter, one can imagine a number of objections in re-
sponse to a conception of the psyche, and by extension, identity, as
multiple. Two which seem particularly potent are the charges of
relativism and essentialism. Hillman himself anticipates the issue
of perceived relativism when he alludes to an apparent "paradise
of seductions and escapades," but notes that from within any par-
ticular narrative structure those of another appear as unrestricted
vagaries. 146 This observation comports with the epistemic struc-
ture upon which Professor Fish predicates his deconstructionist





146. HILLMAN, BLUE FIRE, supra note 91, at 56.
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philosophy.' 47 According to Fish, the proposition of a socially con-
stituted subject simply means that all knowledge is interpretation
and belief. Far from suggesting that knowledge can be acquired
without limit, however, this view focuses on the cultural and insti-
tutional practices of interpretive communities. The existence of
interpretive communities suggests that although each narrative is
unique, we are all subject to social and cultural constraints which
can organize our experience and our selves. 148 The very ability to
formulate a decision in terms that are recognizable to a particular
community "depends on one's having internalized the norms, cate-
gorical distinctions, and evidentiary criteria that make up one's
understanding" of that community. 1
49
This view remains susceptible to the charge of relativism be-
cause it rejects the possibility of any neutral perspective, thereby
exposing the contingent bases for all judgments. The impossibility
of neutrality becomes a problem, for instance, when the idiom
utilized by one party necessarily marginalizes the idiom dominant
in another narrative structure;150 however, Fish points out that
once we become cognizant of the fact that neutral perspectives are
unattainable, we can realize the implications of radical construc-
tivity.15 1 That is, our individual perspectives are imbued with the
preferences, assumptions, and conventions of particular communi-
ties, with the result that the internal constraints and standards of
those communities circumscribe any judgments we make.152
This description of particular communities as establishing
norms explains why transformation in juridical culture is incre-
mental and at times intolerably slow. In fact, the notion that so-
cial reality is constructed leads some commentators to suggest that
there are no longer any incentives for political activism. 153 If we
cannot escape the conventions that by definition constrain us, how
can we act in a critical and transformative capacity? Multiplicity's
147. See generally STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE,
RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989)
[hereinafter FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY] (discussing interpretation re-
sulting from paradigm-specific criteria). For a succinct and accessible overview of
Fish's philosophy as it relates to legal scholarship, see Peter C. Schanck, Under-
standing Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2541-72 (1992).
148. See FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 147, at 141-42.
149. Schanck, supra note 147, at 2546.
150. See Torres, supra note 26, at 1002-03.
151. See STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 319 (1980).
152. See id.
153. See Schanck, supra note 147, at 2548 n.172.
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answer to the charge of relativism is that a de-constructed, experi-
ential conception of identity formation succeeds precisely because
it recognizes the circumscribed and structured nature of human
agency. 154
Mere cognizance, of course, is not sufficient. As Professor
Torres notes, a version of multiplicity which satisfies itself with
awareness will fail to alter patterns of dominance, if only because
even a critical evaluation of privileges associated with membership
in a particular group reinforces membership in that group. 155 Im-
plicit in this limitation is that the central problem for marginalized
people, the "need to reform conceptions of democratic representa-
tion in a way that supports the underlying legitimizing justifica-
tions of democracy without systematically repressing the capacity
for minority self-determination,"'156 is no less complex when viewed
from within a post-modern paradigm. Reformulation of the prob-
lem requires a complex understanding of the numerous demands
made upon those who are disproportionately the victims of harm-
ful speech, among other inequalities, and an approach which rec-
ognizes group differences, complex equalities and multiple forms of
justice.
2. Objections to Multiplicity as Empathy: Essentialism
The answer to the charge of essentialism follows a similar
course. In its simplest form, essentialism describes the belief that
among diverse life experiences there exist commonalities which
are reducible to claims concerning shared realities. It is possible,
in this vein, to claim that multiplicity will only serve to mask the
perpetuation of dominant cultural narratives and will reaffirm the
privileged position of current standards. Robert Chang appears to
make this argument when he vilifies coalition politics because the
identification of articulable common interests remains dependent
on political exigency; 157 however, his version of multiplicity is
154. This position borrows somewhat from Fish's notion of "overlapping com-
munities." See FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 147, at 141.
Against the charge of not being able to transcend one's own contingent identity, it
is sufficient to note that Fish "is not suggesting a monolithic community with rigid
and uniformly held conventions." Schank, supra note 147, at 2549 (responding to
the charge that Fish is a conservative). Because each community is pluralistic,
and because communities overlap, change is in fact inevitable. Change is con-
strained because of a lack of interaction. Transformation then becomes a matter of
exploration and exposure whereby some possibilities are rejected and others en-
joined.
155. See Torres, supra note 26, at 1005.
156. Id. at 1006.
157. See Chang, supra note 105, at 690.
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predicated on establishing, and maximizing the length of "the
chain of equivalences set up between the defense of the rights of
one group and those of other groups." 15 8 What Chang ignores,
then, is the necessity of exploring our identities in order to locate
these sites of intersection and commonality.
The total absence of categories would effectively debilitate
this enterprise. Accepting the notion of multiplicity does not es-
tablish an alternative hegemonic structure so much as it estab-
lishes a strategic method of locating and developing commonali-
ties. As Joan Chalmers Williams notes, "[c]laims of sameness are
not mere assertions of pre-existing similarity; they are a way of
carrying on discussions about social ethics."15 9  In contrast to
Chang, Patricia Williams has located the inefficacy of coalition or
identity politics, not in political exigency, but in apathy. In her
view, it is not the assertion of rights that has done the most harm
to the struggle to end racial and sexual domination, but the lack of
commitment to rights. 60
The self-conscious use of identification as a political strategy
is nonetheless subject to attack. Angela Harris's "nuance theory"
of essentialism posits that even where sensitivity to differences,
contexts and magnitudes of experience exist, these subtle nuances
are merely footnotes to the general account, leaving an essential
experience that is equivalent to the dominant narrative.' 6' It
would be difficult not to sympathize with this account of how
dominant narratives replicate themselves. Harris goes on, how-
ever, to favorably describe Zora Neale Hurston's conception of
identity as "a construction, not an essence-something made of
fragments of experience, not discovered in one's body or unveiled
after male domination is eliminated."'162 The recognition that re-
ality is constructed, it seems, limits any recourse to essentialism.
This description of identity as mere fragments of experience
begs the question of how one is to struggle against oppression. On
one level, the dissection of essentialism is certainly important, due
to the insights it affords us into the constitutive power and inde-
terminate oppression of identity. Wholesale rejection of essential-
ism in every aspect of existence is counterproductive, however, to
158. Id.
159. Joan C. Williams, Dissolving the Sameness/Difference Debate: A Post-
Modern Path Beyond Essentialism in Feminist and Critical Race Theory, 1991
DUKE L.J. 296, 299.
160. See Patricia Williams, The Obliging ShelL An Informal Essay on Formal
Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2128 (1989).
161. See Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 107, at 595.
162. See id. at 613.
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the extent that this strategy disregards our need for psychological
regularity. Professor Harris, recognizing the intractability of the
essential in legal theory, enumerates its useful components.
Among these are intellectual convenience, emotional safety, provi-
sion of a relatively safe arena for engaging in power struggles and
cognitive necessity. 163 Of course, an internal tension lies within
this criticism. As Martha Minow points out, some unifying catego-
ries are necessary to organize experience; even at the cost of de-
nying some of it, some essentialism remains strategically indis-
pensable.164
Rather than continue to debate essentialism as an either/or
proposition, we should attempt to remain mindful of the power of
simplifying categories to perpetuate unconscious, oppressive social
pathologies, while simultaneously remaining vigilant with respect
to the complexity and anomaly of experience. Such an approach
does not yield a practical complacency, but rather would take ad-
vantage of the insight that "the eclecticism of theory mirrors the
historical specificity of the project of building a post-modern poli-
tics,"'165 a politics which both challenges distributions of power and
accounts for the ways in which we view the world. Similarly, Pro-
fessor Unger admonishes us to retain the aspect of modernist cul-
ture that "advocate[s] a relentless recombination of the experi-
ences traditionally identified with distinct roles, genders, classes,
or nations," and "supportfs] both a particularizing and universal-
izing discourse about our experience of life with other people. The
163. See id. at 605-07. This list was formulated with feminist theory in mind,
but serves also to describe the effect of essentialism in arenas such as civil rights
or union organizing.
164. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 47, 51 (1988). Minow notes that the existence of certain categories is a re-
sult of "psychodynamic development," and thus built into our psyches. Id. Simi-
larly, Cornel West admonishes that even if one accepts the post-structuralist claim
that nothing exists outside social practices, "[w]ithout totality, our politics become
emaciated, our politics become dispersed, our politics become nothing but existen-
tial rebellion. Some heuristic (rather than ontological) notion of totality is in fact
necessary if we are to talk about mediations, interrelations, interdependencies,
about totalizing forces in the world." Anders Stephanson, Interview with Cornel
West, in UNIVERSAL ABANDON, supra note 90, at 269.
In many ways the issues of essentialism and relativism reflect what Bern-
stein refers to as Cartesian anxiety: there is either an objective essential reality or
there is only radical, skeptical, relativist anti-essentialism. See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 54, at 18. This choice is left as the single possibility and is one of the common
mistakes of late and post-modernity. See id. at 23. In fact, we may be essential
through one lens and not through another. See id. And, of course, the lack of ob-
jective formalism does not entail relativism or complete subjectivity. See id.
165. Torres, supra note 26, at 1005.
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point is not to choose one over the other but to change the way we
understand and practice both."166
In recounting a story by Zora Neale Hurston, Professor Har-
ris shows that "questions of difference and identity are always
functions of a specific interlocutionary situation-and the answers,
matters of strategy rather than truth."167 The central insight of
multiplicity in legal theory is that our democratic tradition calls
for a synthesizing, rather than a unifying, voice. Instead of dis-
placing the great, liberal normative values of empathy/respect,
autonomy/connectedness, participation/membership, human dig-
nity/justice and liberty/equality, we should work to intertwine
them in such a way that these values are hollow for no one. That
tensions exist within and between these sets of values bespeaks
our varied stories, and reminds us to envision a more encompass-
ing notion of democracy. Despite the danger of importing modes of
dominance, multiplicity recognizes that change always occurs on
the foundation of previous narratives and transformation is avail-
able through meaningful experience.
II. The Pragmatic Case for Democracy
The futility of locating a neutral vantage point from which to
compare and mediate between conflicting values has failed to dis-
suade critics and commentators from advocating for change. 168
Nor has the indeterminacy of language or the non-inclusiveness of
dominant narratives relieved contestants from the need for consid-
ering the persuasive force of their arguments. 169 To the extent
that we insist that theory resolve tension instead of a more modest
goal of informing how we think and talk about these tensions, we
are likely to find theory of very little use. This may be one reason
that post-modernists have weighed so heavily against a grand nar-
rative. But it would also be a mistake to believe that we can or
166. UNGER, PASSION, supra note 80, at 79-80.
167. Harris, Race and Essentialism, supra note 107, at 611.
168. SeeMACINTYRE, supra note 52, at 1-11.
169. Nor should it. Stanley Fish argues that the success of any claim should
depend on the skill of its proponent. See Schanck, supra note 147, at 2550.
Schanck states that Fish goes so far as to suggest that the descriptive accuracy
(which depends, of course, on the assumptions of the community) of an argument
shouldn't matter as much as "how successfully the proponent utilizes the rhetori-
cal conventions of the community." Id. at 2551. See also FISH, DOING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY, supra note 147. That his "solution" should idealize language




should try to exist without a narrative. Indeed, the anti-narrative
itself has been charged with being the latest grand narrative. 170
The failure to articulate a workable theory both creates con-
fusion and reflects the confusion that results from attempts to fit a
round narrative through a square framework. 171 Because we tend
to reify even flawed theories over time, we should revisit the as-
sumptions that underlie cherished values. Through this process
we may agree that some assumptions are no longer valid. The im-
portant point is that agreements and underlying assumptions
should be viewed as provisional, and as effective only to the extent
that they promote and extend the democratic ideal.172
The critique of traditional First Amendment doctrine devel-
oped in the previous section presupposes an acceptance of a plu-
ralist democracy as the appropriate institutional framework for
application of the First Amendment. In a pluralist democracy,
participatory access is a primary societal value within which exist
intertwined strains of liberty and equality. Where democracy is
viewed as paramount, constitutional jurisprudence balances the
significant interplay between the values of liberty and equality.
Without question, the history of the Constitution, and particularly
the First Amendment, has privileged liberty interests over equal-
ity interests. The nascent democratic leanings of the American
experience were identified by de Tocqueville, 173 at a time when hb-
eration from tyranny was of principal concern. The idea began to
germinate in the twentieth century, with the advent of universal
suffrage and the inception of substantive equality. Today, the as-
piration to full and meaningful access to participation remains un-
fulfilled, and for too many democracy is a dream continually de-
ferred.' 74  This is partially because we have little practical
experience with equality relative to liberty. If genuine democracy,
with its concern for participatory equality, remains as an ideal, we
170. See HARVEY, supra note 90, at 8, 339.
171. See supra note 14 (providing examples of theories of the First Amendment
and subsequent criticisms).
172. Of course, one might question whether the democratic ideal, as I, or any
other commentator, define it, should be accepted as an admirable goal. Uncriti-
cally, no. However, a comprehensive answer to this question lies outside the scope
of this Article. The notion of a democracy that is predicated on substantive notions
of participation, on institutions which evince a commitment to membership and
ownership for all participants, and that seeks to maximize liberty and equality
through a shared sense of justice is presumed throughout this piece to be an admi-
rable and attainable ideal.
173. ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1835).
174. See Langston Hughes, Harlem, in Crossing the Danger Water: Four Hun-
dred Years of African-American Writing 508 (Deirdre Mullane ed., 1993)
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need to take seriously Dewey's pragmatic insight that our future is
implicated in our present choices.' 75 Instead of allowing for our
continued descent into racial and class-based social anomie, we
need to overcome the academic and practical hesitancy that cre-
ates inviolable structures through inertia. This section provides a
pragmatic formal justification for democracy as a primary value by
highlighting its experiential, experimental and participatory
strains. In order to justify a mode of First Amendment analysis
that relies on balancing, the multiple interpretive communities
that constitute our society must accept democracy as a mediating
principle.
The view of experience as not only made up of present
choices, but constitutive of our future selves, is most vividly set
forth in the tradition of American pragmatism, 176 beginning with
great independent thinkers such as Jefferson, Lincoln, and Emer-
son, reaching its height in the works of Dewey, James, and Pierce,
and continuing today as a common underpinning to the divergent
work of Seyla Benhabib, Richard Rorty and Cornel West. In the
legal academia such diverse scholars as Daniel Farber, Richard
Posner, Martha Nussbaum, J.M. Balkin, Stanley Fish and Drucilla
Cornell invoke the tools of pragmatism. 177 Though much separates
these thinkers, they notably share a preference for "shaping the
future [compared] to maintaining continuity with the past."'178
175. See DEWEY, supra note 1, at 33.
176. Pragmatism, though largely an American phenomenon, by definition is
open-ended and susceptible to a broad range of influence. Among non-Americans
often identified as pragmatists or as important to the pragmatist tradition, are
Wittgenstein, Habermas, Nietzche, and Bentham. See generally CORNEL WEST,
THE AMERICAN EVASION OF PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM 4 (1989)
C'chart[ing] the emergence, development, decline and resurgence of American
pragmatism"); SIDNEY HOOK, PRAGMATISM AND THE TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE (1974)
(collection of essays about pragmatism).
177. See, e.g., FISH, SPEECH, supra note 5 (discussing the pragmatic jurispru-
dence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin); POSNER, supra note
25 (arguing that "American law really is, and also should be, pragmatic, and that it
can be improved by greater awareness of its pragmatic character); J.M. Balkin,
Transcendental Deconstruction, Transcendent Justice, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1131
(1994) (discussing a pragmatic interpretation of essays written by Jacques Der-
rida); Cornell, Ethics, supra note 59 (discussing pragmatism in the context of Rob-
erto Unger's view of liberalism); Daniel Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal
Pragmnatism for the Twenty-First Century, U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 164 (1995)
(asserting that the examples set by Justice Brandeis "can teach much about how
legal pragmatism can be translated from jurisprudence to practice"); Martha C.
Nussbaum, Skepticism About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107
HARv. L. REV. 714, 717 (1994) (using ancient-modern analogy and asserting that
ancient skepticism, rather than modern skepticism, is similar to "several kinds of
modern anti-normative arguments, or pragmatism").
178. POSNER, supra note 25, at 28. Judge Posner also notes that pragmatism,
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They also share an adherence to the belief that "a fallibilist theory
of knowledge emphasizes, as preconditions to the growth of scien-
tific and other forms of knowledge, the continual testing and
retesting of accepted 'truths,' the constant kicking over of sacred
cows-in short, a commitment to robust and free-wheeling inquiry
.... '"179 This philosophy is disruptive to traditional modes of
thinking within legal institutions. Judge Posner artfully explains
that:
Although American lawyers have made significant contribu-
tions to the theory of free speech, their attitude toward law it-
self is pious and reverential rather than inquiring and chal-
lenging. Law is not a sacred text, however, but a usually
humdrum social practice vaguely bounded by ethical and po-
litical convictions. The soundness of legal interpretations and
other legal propositions is best gauged, therefore, by an ex-
amination of their consequences in the world of fact ....
[Tihere is a tendency in law to look backward rather than for-
ward-to search for essences rather than to embrace the expe-
riential flux.180
The challenge posed by pragmatism is to recognize the extent to
which the past, as represented by the present, implicates the fu-
ture.
John Dewey acknowledged the profound constructedness of
pragmatism when he noted that "[s]ociety not only continues to
exist by transmission, by communication, but it may fairly be said
to exist in transmission, in communication."' 18 1  Community
building occurs through a process of communication that results in
shared aims, beliefs, aspirations and knowledge. 182 According to
Dewey, this process must ensure participation in a common under-
standing, in such a way as to secure a common manner of re-
sponding to expectations. In this way, communication is always
instructive, both for the recipient and for the one communicating
an experience. Communication is educational because to commu-
nicate one must formulate an experience: "[t]o formulate requires
getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see it, considering
what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may
properly understood, is an attitude rather than a dogma. Quoting Professor West,
Posner describes pragmatism as "an attitude whose 'common denominator' is 'a
future-oriented' instrumentalism that tries to deploy thought as a weapon to en-
able more effective action." Id.
179. Id. at 466.
180. Id. at 467-68.
181. JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION 4 (Free Press Paperback ed. 1966).
182. See id.
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be got into such form that he can appreciate its meaning."'183 In
the end, the process of community building through communica-
tion not only educates, but "creates responsibility for accuracy and
vividness of statement and thought."'8 4
This last phrase bears strong similarities to the "ideal speech
situation" propounded by Habermas'8 5 insofar as it shows a lack of
concern for metaphysical inquiry, and a pronounced bias for par-
ticipatory equality in an experientially inclined democracy. 8 6 Re-
formulated less abstractly, Dewey's belief in the force of experience
leads one to inquire about the communities which are confined, if
not in spirit, then in fact. The fortress domesticity currently
holding sway in large segments of society marginalizes narratives
by removing them from the mix that will eventually culminate in a
set of shared values, assumptions, and methods for extracting
these norms from experience. 187 Society is undermined by our
practice of power and hegemony.
Increasing residential polarization in our largest cities exac-
erbates the isolation of narrative structures. Empirical evidence
shows that the systematic exclusion of minority populations from
White neighborhoods and their attendant opportunity structures
does not result from natural forces or individual preferences;
rather discriminatory practices and racial perceptions impose and
perpetuate our increasing residential and intellectual apartheid. 188
183. Id. at 5-6.
184. Id. at 6.
185. See SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA 285 (1986) (discussing
Habermas' "ideal speech situation").
186. While the notion of the ideal speech situation is useful as a regulative
ideal, the efficacy of language as a heuristic tool is limited because it is intrinsi-
cally tied up in the operations of power within social practices. The analysis of
language is useful for examining how narrative forms are produced and acquired,
but should not be mistaken for or extend to a recrudescence of metaphysicality.
See Stephanson, supra note 164, at 273-74.
187. See FISH, SPEECH, supra note 5, at 103-04 (discussing how in traditional
free speech theory the extirpation of narratives that fall outside the bounds of the
dominant discourses is reinforced by the very primacy of those dominant values).
188. See Alex M. Johnson, Jr., How Race and Poverty Intersect to Prevent Inte-
gration: Destabilizing Race as a Vehicle to Integrate Neighborhoods, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 1595, 1612-14 (1995) (stating that past practices of overt discrimination pro-
duce the entrenched segregation prevalent in urban areas today); see also
DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION
AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS, 160-61, 118-25 (1993) (stating that negative
perceptions and associated phenomena such as racial "tipping," where White mid-
dle-class populations flee neighborhoods out of concern for property values and re-
duced quality of services when minority populations reach a certain level, explain
the increasing severity of segregation to the point where some inner city residents
live their entire lives without leaving the confines of their neighborhood, and ex-
plaining how segregation concentrates poverty in an endless downward spiral of
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Isolation of minority communities in turn exacerbates the racial
stereotypes that inform White decisions to flee urban centers for
suburban enclaves of convenience and affluence. 189 Even though
many minorities and Whites prefer more integrated neighbor-
hoods, White practices, coupled with the greater mobility atten-
dant to higher income levels, dictate residential segregation. 190 We
have structured the market so that it is rational for nondiscrimi-
natory actors to isolate poor minorities. All but the most progres-
sive Whites are unwilling to risk the decrease in property values
and in quality of services in order to live in an integrated commu-
nity.
Such experiential complacency stands in stark contrast to the
spirit of experimentalism which characterized the thinking of early
participatory democrats. In defending before Congress his policies
of federally-sponsored internal improvements, Lincoln rejected a
policy of "do nothing at all, lest you do something wrong."191 He
went on to chastise his opponents for focusing on the negative as-
pects of change, stating his viewpoint:
[t]he true rule, in determining to embrace, or reject any thing,
is not whether it have any evil in it; but whether it have more
of evil, than of good. There are few things wholly evil, or
wholly good. Almost every thing, especially of governmental
policy, is an inseparable compound of the two; so that our best
judgment of the preponderance between them is continually
demanded.192
Lincoln was not promoting an aimless experimentalism. His
belief in teleology, and the prospects of the American people, drove
his vision of democracy. The famous phrase denoting the consent
of the governed, "of the people, by the people, and for the people,"
was borrowed by Lincoln from his close friend, the minister Theo-
economic and social isolation); Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation:
Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 MINN. L. REV. 825, 866 (1996) (attributing
White flight to a desire on the part of the White middle-class to avoid integrated
schools).
189. See John Charles Boger, The Urban Crisis: The Kerner Commission Report
Revisited, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1289, 1299 (1993) (noting that isolation also impacts mi-
nority students' self-perception and contributes to low achievement taking away
any sense of "destiny control"); Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and
Transformation, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1995) (emphasizing that isolation
from opportunity structures influences the construction of racial stereotypes).
190. While Black preferences are largely for integrated neighborhoods, see John
Charles Boger, Toward Ending Residential Segregation: A Fair Share Proposal for
the Next Reconstruction, 71 N.C. L. Rev. 1573, 1577 (1993), White preferences are
for minority populations of less than 20%, see MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 188,
at 93.
191. LINCOLN ON DEMOCRACY 38 (Mario M. Cuomo & Harold Holzer eds., 1990).
192. Id. at 39.
[Vol 16:97
DELIMITATION OF HARMFUL SPEECH
dore Parker, whose brand of transcendentalism influenced Lin-
coln's brand of pragmatic democracy. 93 Parker's theology hinged
on contrasting "the ideal Jesus with all the provisional expressions
of that ideal in biblical texts or church doctrines."'194 Similarly,
Parker's, and Lincoln's, political theology held that the vision of
the Declaration of Independence represented the ideal democracy,
in contrast to provisional expressions of that ideal in the Constitu-
tion or the body politic. 95 This is the Lincoln Cornel West speaks
of when he says: "Lincoln's profound wrestling with a deep sense
of evil that fuels struggle for justice endeavors to hold at bay facile
optimisms and paralyzing pessimisms by positing unique selves
that fight other finite opponents rather than demonic foes."' 9 6
Lincoln's conception of human agency and democratic possi-
bility, maintaining a direct lineage to the Jeffersonian insistence
on "the irreducibility of individuality within participatory commu-
nities," was a maneuver intended "to sidestep rapacious individu-
alisms and authoritarian communitarianisms."'197 A maneuver in-
tended, in other words, to mediate between variable conceptions of
liberty as license and equality as imposition. Lincoln was not an
idealist, and never believed that complete equality of existence
could be achieved, or was even desirable, but he was a regulative
idealist, believing that participatory equality was a procedural im-
perative to democracy. 198 In his political world, a pragmatic per-
spective warranted activism.
Lincoln's view-activism without idealism-foreshadowed the
current recognition that even an ideal speech situation will always
be distorted by power relationships. Contemporary pragmatists
debate about the extent to which "unconstrained dialogue" and
"discourse free from domination" are possible.199 The need for such
discourse stems from our aspiration of attaining 'a rationally mo-
tivated consensus' on controversial claims."200  According to
Habermas, conditions necessary to achieving a valid consensus of
this type can be reduced to four: first, an equal opportunity to ini-
193. Garry Wills, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words That Remade America 106-
08 (1992).
194. Id. at 108.
195. See id. at 108-10; cf. ADLER, supra note 4, at 35-41 (discussing the ideals
embodied in the Declaration of Independence).
196. CORNEL WEST, KEEPING FAITH: PHILOSOPHY AND RACE IN AMERICA 108
(1993).
197. See id. at 107.
198. See WILLS, supra note 193, at 96-97.
199. See, e.g., BENHABIB, supra note 185, at 282-301.
200. Id. at 284.
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tiate and continue communication; second, an equal chance to con-
tribute and participate, as by making assertions and clarifying;
third, an equal opportunity to express one's feelings and desires,
intentions and motivations; and fourth, "the speakers must act as
if in contexts of action there is an equal distribution of chances 'to
order and resist orders, to promise and to refuse, to be accountable
for one's conduct and to demand accountability from others."'201
The result of consensus reached under this suspension of
"untruthfulness and duplicity on the one hand, and of inequality
and subordination on the other"202 would be an agreement that is
dependent solely upon the force of the better argument. In other
words, adherence to this set of rules may reduce the impact of
power relations on the outcome of dialogue.
While not a panacea, Habermas' vision, as refined by Ben-
habib and others, works to expose the structures of speech situa-
tions and assists in reconstructing presuppositions attendant to
argumentation and debate. Going further, we might also see the
attempt to integrate constrained dialogue as a necessary first step
in the pragmatic project of imaginatively experimenting with the
possible reconstruction of democratic society. Roberto Unger no-
tices that one weakness in Habermas' ideal is the assumption that
certain beliefs are authoritative simply because they are likely to
thrive in a modern democracy. 20 3 In his view, this merely contin-
ues the futile search for "a speculative simulacrum of impartiality
of judgment," allowing us a provisional set of rules for doling out
rights while leaving the structural presuppositions unchal-
lenged.204 As an alternative, Unger suggests "the working out, in
imagination and practice, of institutional variations on the realiza-
tion and reshaping of our interests and ideals." 20 5 This insistence
on the provisional nature of structure is not radical, but mirrors
one of the basic premises of nineteenth century pragmatism-that
well-developed senses of experimentalism and fallibility were nec-
essary to the success of the American experience.
If our capacities stem from minimizing external constraints
to full participation in the social environment, the continuing re-
formulation of particular social environments will become neces-
201. Id. at 285 (translating a quote from JORGEN HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien,
ill WIRKLICHKEIT UND REFLEXION (H. Fahrenbach ed., 1973).
202. Id.
203. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS
BECOME? 177 (1996).
204. Id. at 182.
205. Id.
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sary. Dewey, providing a developed philosophical framework for
Lincoln's observations, understood experience as having specific
consequences for the future.20 6 Experience for Dewey involves
both an act and a passive reception of that act's consequence:
"[w]hen an activity is continued into the undergoing of conse-
quences, when the change made by action is reflected back into a
change made in us, the mere flux is loaded with significance. We
learn something."207  In this understanding of education, the
"unconscious influence of the environment" plays a significant role.
The operations of our interpretive community establish the trajec-
tory and ultimately delimit the parameters of our education. 2
08
From the centrality of consequences and the contingency of
truth springs the realization that all our opinions and beliefs have
ethical consequences. Dewey argues that "[a]n empiricism which
is content with repeating facts already past has no place for possi-
bility and for liberty."20 9 The future has significance because hu-
man agency can make a difference-actions and opinions trans-
form future aims and purposes. Belief in transformation and
evolving notions of justice is an integral part of the American ide-
ology, dating from Emerson to the present day. 210 Although that
belief can be challenged by despair over the still remote approxi-
mation to the promise of authentic democracy, 211 pragmatism ad-
monishes us to retain the belief that notions such as "justice" and
"liberty" can be assessed through the actual, substantive results of
the law.
III. Liberty and Justice for All
Although analytical frameworks are indeterminate on an
epistemological and metaphysical level, there are at least two ways
in which our beliefs, opinions and actions are determinate. Josiah
Royce, responding to the pragmatist axioms of contingency and
206. See DEWEY, supra note 181, at 140.
207. Id. at 139.
208. See Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1671, 1687-88 (1990). Dewey conceived of democracy as an "empirical hy-
pothesis" that ordinary people are capable of utilizing "social intelligence" to solve
social problems. Id. A precondition to this conception of politics is an extirpation
of the myopia caused by privilege and monopolistic access to critical institutions
(those institutions which generate and define social values). In other words, par-
ticipatory opportunity and a sense of ownership of one's lived reality are essential
to the production of a genuine democracy.
209. JOHN DEWEY, PHILOSOPHY AND CIVILIZATION 25 (1968). See WEST, supra
note 196, at 111 (giving a summation of Dewey's pragmatism).
210. See WEST, supra note 196, at 107.
211. See Bell, supra note 63, at 373-75.
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fallibility, suggested that "if any one wants to be in touch with the
'Absolute' . . . let [that person] simply do any individual deed
whatever and then try to undo that deed .... Let the truths which
that experience teaches any rational being show [that person] also
what is meant by absolute truth."2 12 In other words, the fact that
our actions have ethical consequences imbues them with a sense of
urgency, despite the fallibility of all facts and the contingency of
all experience.
On a second, distinct level, Professors Sunstein and MacIn-
tyre each make reference to the fact that pragmatic, contingent ac-
counts of human possibility "seem[ ] inspired by the Enlighten-
ment commitment to human liberation."213  Any theory or
philosophy is the product of individuals inescapably involved in
the conflicts central to the development of their own community.
The extent to which any set of narratives overlaps with those of
another community may be said to speak to the resolution of com-
mon conflicts. 214 Thus any system can be said to attain determi-
nacy to the extent that first, all actions taken within that system
have ethical consequences, insofar as they irrevocably work to es-
tablish contingent truths, and second, that all human agents are
inextricably bound up in the central narratives of a time and place.
Because it may be impossible or undesirable to escape the
narrative of liberalism completely, we examine its ability to actu-
ally achieve an authentic justice. There is no simple meaning of
liberalism, but many evolving strains. It may be useful to consider
Ronald Dworkin's distinction between neutrality-based liberalism
and equality-based liberalism. 21 5 The former opposes any limita-
tions on personal liberty because of moral skepticism toward the
claim that any particular mode of being is better than any other
mode. The latter version holds as fundamental the proposition
that governments treat all citizens as equals, and insists on moral
neutrality only to the extent that this notion of equality permits.
Neutrality-based liberalism contains internal flaws which recom-
mend against its maintenance. The first, and most obvious flaw, is
the conviction that a hands-off approach with regard to personal
212. JOSIAH ROYCE, THE SOURCES OF RELIGIOUS INSIGHT 154 (1912).
213. Cass R. Sunstein, Democracy Isn't What You Think- Between Facts and
Norms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1996, at 29; cf. MACINTYRE, supra note 52, at 392
(concluding that each narrative claim concerning the boundaries of justice (e.g.
Humean tradition or Augustinian tradition) is advanced "within an institutional-
ized framework largely informed by the assumptions of liberalism, so that the in-
fluence of liberalism extends beyond the effects of its explicit advocacy.").
214. See MACINTYRE, supra note 52, at 389.
215. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 205 (1985).
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liberties is somehow "neutral." In fact, this approach permits a
form of privileging that denies alternative definitions of liberty,
allowing liberty to be confused with license.
Second, neutrality-based liberalism provides no moral basis
for claims against injustice. Embedded in the idea of a govern-
ment which abstains from regulating liberties is the concomitant
conviction that the status quo adequately represents the subdivi-
sions of social contract. In this way, moral skepticism can produce
an uncritical acceptance of dominant narratives, with the implicit
suggestion that alternative conceptions lack merit. This leads
Dworkin to state that neutrality-based liberalism "is a negative
theory for uncommitted people." 216
Even within the framework of equality-based liberalism there
are alternative conceptions of what justice requires. 217 Most im-
mediately familiar is the distinction between substantive and for-
mal equality.218 Aristotle based his theory of justice upon this dis-
tinction, stating that "justice is thought to be equality; and so it is,
but for equals, not for everybody. Inequality is also thought to be
just; and so it is, but for unequals, not for everybody. They omit
the 'for whom' and judge badly."219 In order to see that differences
justify different treatment, we need to recognize that people judge
poorly "because each side is really saying something true about
justice and hence thinks it is saying the whole truth."220
Aristotle suggests that society will behave justly, sometimes
because a person is just, at others because a person, though not
just, respects the laws or fears obloquy.22 1 But in either case, the
person has learned to act in accordance with the precepts of justice
216. Id.; cf. Putnam, supra note 208, at 1688 (identifying as the fundamental
principle of Dewey's democratic theory that "the use of 'social intelligence' . . . is
incompatible, on the one hand, with denying the underprivileged the opportunity
to develop and use their capacities, and, on the other hand, with the rationaliza-
tion of entrenched privilege.").
217. See ROSENFELD, supra note 60, at 13 (noting that justice has been equated
with equality since antiquity), 340 n.2 (acknowledging disagreement between phi-
losophers as to whether these concepts can be equated).
218. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds
of Equality, 12 LAw & INEQ. J. 381, 384 (1994) (likening the plurality of meanings
in "equality" to the Greeks' distinction between geometric and arithmetic equal-
ity). Arithmetic equality occurs when a first number exceeds a second by the same
amount that the second exceeds a third, yielding a constant numerical distance.
See id. at 421 (quoting F.D. HARVEY, Two Kinds of Equality, in CLASSICA ET
MEDIAEVALIA 101, 103-04 (1965)). Geometric equality occurs when the ratio be-
tween the first and second numbers is the same as that between the second and
third, so that, for instance, one item is always twice the other. See id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See MACINTYRE, supra note 52, at 113.
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though experience. Education ensures that the polis operates to
achieve all the good for all of its citizens. 222 Rawls asserts that to
assess whether a society is just, it is inadequate to look only at
whether the individuals are just. One must look at the structure
and practices of the society. 223 In examining the issue of hate
speech in a democratic society, one must look at the underlying in-
stitutional structure and arrangement; and in particular, at the
inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the institutional arrangements.
The consequence of what it might entail to achieve the good
for all citizens in a modern society is a subject of considerable de-
bate. What is clear, however, is that an assessment of the good re-
quires that all citizens be accorded equal opportunity to participate
in the discourse of world-making. A concern for membership re-
mains one of the defining characteristics of the liberal tradition.
There nonetheless exists a gulf between labeling someone as a
nominal member of society and giving that member an ownership
role in shaping the community's priorities. Without a sense of
ownership, there can be no reasonable expectation that the Jones
family will be willing to accept the burden of tolerating a cross
burning on their yard.224 Only if the Jones family can identify
themselves as owners within a community and rightfully perceive
themselves as having power to shape their community's values
should they be expected to self-identify as members, thus accord-
ing tacit approval to the judgment that justice requires their toler-
ance of an act intended to convey the message that they are em-
phatically not a part of the community. Of course the very purpose
and effect of hate speech is to deny and disparage the marginal
membership of the less-favored subject.
What is at stake when St. Paul prohibits hate speech and
racist acts under penalty of criminal sanctions? 225 Opinions such
as that of Justice Scalia would have us believe that what is at
stake is free speech itself.226 Those who strike down prohibitions
222. See DEWEY, supra note 181, at 90.
223. See RAWLS, supra note 3, at 7-11.
224. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 379-80 (1992) (presenting a
skeletal outline of the facts of the case); Lawrence, supra note 17, at 787
(examining the facts of the case in detail).
225. St. Paul prosecuted R.A.V. under the city's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordi-
nance, the constitutionality of which was the subject of the decision. See R.A. V.,
505 U.S. at 380. After presenting the facts, Justice Scalia backhandedly chastised
the City of St. Paul for prosecuting the case under this ordinance. See id.
226. Contrary to Justice Scalia's suggestion, there are numerous competing no-
tions of equality and different ways in which members of a free society may weigh
these notions. Judge Alex Kozinski, in a recent speech at the University of Minne-
sota, argued that each member of a community has a responsibility to mitigate the
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on hate speech insist that the Jones family assimilate, accepting
the values of the larger society, even as society rejects their capac-
ity for ownership. 227 Free speech is not at stake; what is at stake
is a particular application of a particular notion of equality. This
is the notion of equal individual rights before the state, understood
as a limitation on the state's power to restrict expression.
Rather than characterize the debate over regulation of racist
speech as one of liberty versus equality, we should characterize it
as one concerning "domains of equality."228 "[D]omains of equality
refers to the classes of things that are to be allocated equally."229
This definition begs the question of why certain classes of things,
and not others, are to be allocated equally. I have suggested that
the breadth of a particular domain of equality may be ascertained
by reference to the endured experience of participants in a demo-
cratic society. The expansiveness or narrowness in a particular
domain of equality exists at a level of abstraction of a degree less
than that underpinning all of liberal theory. Instead, the notion of
breadth queries whether justice requires that we move beyond the
narrowest possible construction of equality. In any event, these
questions exist prior to any confrontation with liberty claims.
That is, a narrow conception of equality will obviously be less com-
patible with regulation of speech than will a more expansive defi-
nition.230 Of course, this raises the question of why a more expan-
harm done by racist or otherwise egregiously insensitive and psychologically
harmful speech, by assuring the victim that they do not share the feelings of ha-
tred or ill-will that informed the harmful act. Drawing on a Jewish tradition in
which each member of the community, without stopping to inquire into blame or
individual responsibility, joins together with other members in offering prayers of
atonement to God when the Torah accidentally touches the floor, Judge Kozinski
asserted that individual community members should take responsibility for en-
suring that victims of racist speech feel membership in the community. The harm,
as his speech recognized, is that racist speech indicates that a certain, unknowable
proportion of the population wishes to exclude minority citizens from participating
fully in society. It is this anti-democratic sentiment that must be weighed against
the liberty interests represented by the First Amendment.
227. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Portraits of
Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 296 (1995) (noting that the
law "can unsettle expectations and destabilize the status ordering of groups");
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 218-19 (1983).
228. See DOUGLAS RAE ET AL., EQUALITIES 45-49 (1981); ROSENFELD, supra note
60, at 16-17.
229. ROSENFELD, supra note 60, at 16 (quoting RAE, supra note 228, at 45).
230. See id. at 17. Rosenfeld also notes the importance of the distinction be-
tween a "domain of allocation" and a "domain of account' in Professor Rae's struc-
tural grammar of equality. The former comprises the class of things controlled for
the purpose of allocation, and the latter the class of things for which a given actor
seeks equality. In a claim for equality, the agent for the domain of allocation must
assess the extent to which available resources overlap with the request. This dis-
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sive notion of equality is appropriate. In this Article, I have pos-
ited that justice and participation are the values that should in-
form this question. Such an inquiry is a programatic and experi-
ential question as well as a normative one.23 1
tinction has repercussions for regulation of speech insofar as the state may fairly
be said to be the only agent capable of structuring a dispensation of participatory
interests.
231. Substantive equality has the potential to serve a transformative role for
lessening racial domination in today's world much in the same way that formal
(narrow) equality played a transformative role during the Jim Crow period. Pro-
fessor Crenshaw, for instance, has identified in the rhetoric of formal equality
transformative and legitimating, sustaining and undermining aspects. See Kim-
berl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Anti Discrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1347-48 (1988).
Although today formal equality seems limited in its ability to improve the lives of
those victimized by racism, the notion of the equality of our worth as human be-
ings remains a pinnacle of philosophical achievement, a lofty position that per-
petually engenders hope for realization; and therein lies its transformative poten-
tial. See powell, Racial Realism, supra note 63, at 549-51. While this potential
provides a pragmatic justification for a heightened emphasis on substantive
equality, there will be questions of whether such an emphasis will positively im-
pact the lives of the victims of hate speech, and if so, whether the benefit is worth
the chink in the armor of the First Amendment.
Professor Elena Kagan worries that a shift in First Amendment doctrine al-
lowing for some regulation of racist speech and pornography may prove detrimen-
tal to the cause of anti-subordination. See Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech
and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 873, 882 (1993). While recog-
nizing that judicial identification of viewpoint-based regulation "may well depend
on the decisionmaker's viewpoint," and that these decisionmakers are "least likely
to recognize (or count as relevant) viewpoint regulation when the regulator's view-
point lines up with [their] own," id. at 880-81, Keegstra nonetheless believes that
allowing legislators to take this reality into account amounts to an impermissible
"imposition of an official orthodoxy." Id. at 882 (quoting The Hon. John Paul Ste-
vens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1304 (1993)). Professor Kagan,
although willing to partially acknowledge the problems associated with viewing
the world exclusively through one's own narrative structure and unconsciously
adopting positions in accordance with that structure, seems unconvinced that the
law has any transformative capacity. Instead, she suggests that women and mi-
norities should argue for retaining the current conception of viewpoint neutrality
because it ensures that legislative decisionmakers cannot impose an orthodoxy
which excludes them. Professor Kagan thus acknowledges both the harm that
stems from pornography and racist speech, as well as the tendency of purportedly
neutral rules to perpetuate a contingent status quo, but stops short of recognizing
that the connection between these two phenomena recommend searching out
transformative capacities in the law. While some commentators question whether
the law is a proper or efficacious vehicle for transformation, see POSNER, supra
note 25, at 213-15, there can be little question that law can and does presage the
acceptance by society of some fundamental change. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the
Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022-25 (1996) (noting that
particular positive laws make statements in support of or against a particular
proposition, thereby (sometimes subtly) altering social norms, and behavior).
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A. A Case Study in Mediation
Against the charge that inclusiveness at the expense of what
many members of society consider our most basic freedom signals
the decline of liberal democratic society, one might present the ex-
ample of Regina v. Keegstra.232 This Canadian Supreme Court
case, which serves as an example of an alternative way of using
democratic principles to valorize liberty and equality, involved the
prosecution of an Alberta high school teacher, charged with com-
municating anti-Semitic statements to his students and requiring
them to reproduce these views on exams. Mr. Keegstra was prose-
cuted under § 319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code, which gener-
ally prohibits "communicating statements, other than in private
conversation, [which] willfully promote hatred against any identi-
fiable group."2 33 Claiming that the law violated his right to free
expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms, roughly equivalent to the First Amendment of our
Constitution,234 Mr. Keegstra appealed his conviction. In uphold-
ing his conviction, the Canadian Supreme Court determined that
this expression was not protected, as it was not expression that
'serves individual and societal values in a free and democratic so-
ciety."'2 35 The Court determined that although the hate speech law
limited Mr. Keegstra's right to free expression, it was a justifiable
delimitation in a free and democratic society. What was at stake
turned out not to be the core of free expression in a democratic so-
ciety. What was at stake, for the Canadian Supreme Court, was an
ideal: meaningful democracy.
This decision offers a profound contrast to American case law
on the same subject. The analysis follows a path within the
bounds of a commitment to both liberty and equality, and mediates
between these values by recourse to a collective concern for the
underlying values and principles of the society, including social
justice. 236 In determining what limitations on universal rights are
232. [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1. Professor Fish also cites Regina v. Keegstra as an ex-
ample of a permissible restriction of free expression, noting that the Canadian
court's reasoning starts from the premise that the right of expression must always
be balanced against the principles of membership in a society. See FISH, SPEECH,
supra note 5, at 104-05.
233. Regina, 2 W.W.R. at 18.
234. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), §2(b) (stating that everyone has "freedom of thought, belief, opinion
and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communica-
tion").
235. 2 W.W.R. 27 (quoting CAN. CONST., supra note 234, at § 1).
236. See id. at 34 (quoting R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 136).
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permitted or required by a free and democratic society, the court
notes that "the proper judicial perspective under [Section One]
must be derived from an awareness of the synergetic relation be-
tween two elements: the values underlying the Charter and the
circumstances of the particular case."237
More significantly, the Canadian Supreme Court asserted
that Mr. Keegstra's expression bears only a tenuous relationship to
the values embedded in section 2(b), commenting that:
one's conception of the freedom of expression provides a cru-
cial backdrop to any [section 2(b)] inquiry; the values pro-
moted by the freedom help not only to define the ambit of
[section 2(b)], but also come to the forefront when discussing
how competing interests might co-exist with the freedom un-
der [Section One] of the Charter. 238
Commenting that it is destructive of free expression values them-
selves, as well as other democratic values, "to treat all expression
as equally crucial to those principles at the core" of free expres-
sion,239 the Court suggested that democratic principles recommend
viewing free expression as a function of three underlying goals.
These goals are truth attainment, ensuring self-fulfillment and the
development of self-identity, and most importantly, from the
Court's perspective, the guarantee that the opportunity for par-
ticipation in the democratic process is open to all.2 40 The Court si-
multaneously supports these rationales with the observations that
hate speech can impede the search for truth, impinge on the
autonomy necessary to individual development and subvert the
democratic process. Cognizant that the regulation "muzzles the
participation of a few individuals in the democratic process," 241 the
Court remains certain that the loss of that voice is not substan-
tial.242 Any decision that inhibits participation should bear a very
237. Id. at 35.
238. Id. at 26.
239. Id. at 53.
240. See id. at 55.
241. Id. at 56.
242. Superficially, in light of the dominant stature of the "more speech" solution
in American jurisprudence, this solution appears hypocritical. However, a more
nuanced and rational exploration of the distinction between the interests of Mr.
Keegstra and those harmed (the students and Jews with whom they come into
contact) reveal that a notion of justice infused with participation supports this
choice. See ROSENFELD, supra note 60, at 249-51 (suggesting the concept of reci-
procity, or justice as reversibility, as a means of testing competing claims). When
competing claims stem from incompatible ideological systems, justice as reversi-
bility offers no reason for one claimant to subordinate his or her interests to the
other. See id. By this logic, a racist may admit that his views are harmful, but
claim that his position is religiously mandated. Such a radical variance of perspec-
tive, while rendering claims incommensurable, does not, however, mean anything
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heavy burden of justification. What is most instructive about the
decision is that the Court was willing to employ a democratic cal-
culus.
The outcome of the decision, however, is less important than
the reasoning. 243 This case cogently demonstrates that an inter-
pretive methodology that recognizes the shared attributes of jus-
tice and equality will be less likely to privilege liberty interests.
We have seen that the concept of justice is not monolithic, but
rather depends for its substance on the perspectives of its explica-
tors. This decision has less to do with a conflict between liberty
and equality than it does with the adoption of a "domain of equal-
ity" capable of grasping the importance of participation to the ex-
ercise of democratic prerogatives. 244
The Canadian Supreme Court felt that the objectives of the
hate-speech regulation were clear, and included minimizing the
impact of emotional, psychological, and participatory consequences
arising from hate speech as well as protecting against the potential
for hate speech to gain credence, thereby contributing to discrimi-
nation.245 There must be a fine line guarding the government's ca-
pacity to impose an orthodoxy concerning what obtains toward
truth, but on this view, the damage to individual possibility and
democratic probability crosses that line. This decision turns on the
unwillingness of the Canadian Supreme Court to accept abstract
justifications for free expression. Instead, they exhibit tolerance
only for free expression which comports with co-equal values.
Section One of the Canadian Constitution requires that the
specific rights granted to each member of that society not impinge
on the society's identity as a democracy. 246 Although our Constitu-
tion contains no such provision, Professor Adler has suggested that
for the adjudication of competing claims within a coherent and just system of gov-
ernance. Because Mr. Keegstra implicitly accepts the requisites of democratic so-
ciety, his refusal to abide by the dictates of that system provides no defense.
243. Cf. Farber, supra note 177, at 189 (suggesting that a "Brandeis-ian"' solu-
tion to the problem of hate speech would involve imaginative efforts at framing the
fundamental issues involved and would expand the parameters of debate and dia-
logue to identify ultimate goals; this approach similarly counsels not for or against
one constituency, but rather attempts to delve beneath the antagonisms of superfi-
cial debate).
244. See ROSENFELD, supra note 60, at 16-21 (discussing the view that identifi-
cation of a domain of equality is prior to engaging questions of liberty).
245. See Regina v. Keegstra [1991] 2 W.W.R. 1, 43.
246. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), §1 ("The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits proscribed
by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.").
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the Declaration of Independence fulfills this role. 247 The Declara-
tion sets forth the political principles which underlie the Constitu-
tion. That the Constitution failed to represent those principles,
and required the Civil War and amendment to do so should not di-
vert our attention from that pledge. Despite the self evidence of
the truths contained in our version of Section One, we continue to
permit obfuscation to yield doctrinaire and decontextualized solu-
tions to difficult legal and ethical dilemmas. When values are at
odds, we would do well to follow the Canadian example and admit
the clash. Only then will it be possible to say what justice re-
quires.
Conclusion
Projecting the decision in Keegstra onto an American screen,
we might say that the First Amendment is slow in heading toward
the confluence of liberty and equality, slow in accepting the inter-
sectionalities of the American voice. 248 This is perhaps in part be-
cause we succumb to the loudest of American voices which pro-
claim the evil of tyranny in the modern guise of state censorship to
an ever credulous society. The threat of silencing great poetic
voices and placing facades of intolerance in front of great art elicit
immediate and vociferous responses. But when the response in-
evitably fails to consider that the silence and invisibility which lie
in the wake of oppression are also the stuff of limits, we fail to
achieve the ideal of "a free and democratic society."249
What is at stake when we regulate forms of hate speech? Not
"free expression," however that may be defined at the moment
(consider the powerful implications of social inertia embedded in
O'Brien, Texas v. Johnson, and Abrans). Keegstra v. Regina ad-
monishes us to accept that the First Amendment, like any guiding
principle, will always be infused with a set of values, that no holy
writ exists to which we can appeal for a definitive or doctrinaire
solution. The First Amendment is only a set of words, "inherently
nothing,"250 to which we bring our provisional judgments. Though
247. See ADLER, supra note 4, at 37-38.
248. See Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance: Freedom of Ex-
pression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REV. 737 (1993) (identifying in
recent commentary on the First Amendment a nascent shift in thinking, away
from doctrinaire constructions, and toward a more nuanced and complex set of
formulations that comport more closely with the realities of our lived experience).
249. CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms), § 1.
250. FiSH, SPEECH, supra note 5, at 113.
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dialogue will eventuate alteration and transformation,25 ' any shift
in contexts must be constrained by the dictates of justice in a
democratic society. This delimitation is no mere imposition of a
personal preference, but rather an observation culled from em-
ploying experience as a metaphor for transformation. 25 2 You can't
just decide you are going to change the behavior of a nation. But
you can decide that in making difficult judgments about what jus-
tice should require or permit, a nation may be asked to adhere to
its basic values, and if these are in tension, seek recourse in a
judgment infused with the ideals of pragmatic democracy.
251. See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text (discussing the intersection
of transformation and experience).
252. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, supra note 14, at 70-94 (discussing how the
slow transformation in White American "images of the outsider" yields a "how
could they" reaction in response to yesterday's racist depiction).
1998]

